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Abstract 
We estimate loss aversion using on an online survey of a representative sample of over 4,000 
UK residents. The average aversion to a loss of £500 relative to a gain of the same amount is 
2.41, but loss aversion varies significantly with characteristics such as gender, age, education, 
financial knowledge, social class, employment status, management responsibility, income, 
savings and home ownership. Other influencing factors include marital status, number of 
children, ease of savings, rainy day fund, personality type, emotional state, newspaper and 
political party. However, once we condition on all the profiling characteristics of the 
respondents, some factors, in particular gender, cease to be significant, suggesting that gender 
differences in risk and loss attitudes might be due to other factors, such as income differences.  
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1. Introduction 
The simplest canonical models in economics assume that agents have identical preferences 
and that they maximise expected utility. In this paper, we contribute to the literature on more 
sophisticated models of human behaviour by using survey data to estimate differences in 
preferences where we allow agents to have a more general objective function. In particular, 
we estimate a simple parametric representation of Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) model of 
loss aversion for 4,016 respondents who form a representative sample of individuals in the 
United Kingdom. We show that responses are consistent with loss aversion, but that attitudes 
to risk in both the gain and loss domains are significantly correlated with reported 
characteristics of the respondents. The importance of our contribution is that we provide 
evidence on a much larger and more representative sample than has been considered hitherto. 
For at least fifty years, economists have been aware that the expected utility (EU) model 
might not fully capture consumer behaviour under risk (Allais (1953), Samuelson (1963), 
Rabin and Thaler (2001)) and this has led to a range of more general models being proposed. 
Simply put, the EU model assumes that the objective function depends on two components: 
first, the value (or utility, loosely defined) of a state depends upon the consumption or wealth 
in that state without regard to how it was reached; second, when considering more than one 
possible outcome, the different states of the world are weighted by the subjective probability 
of each state occurring. In the specific example of the EU model, the objective function is 
 ( )i i
i
p u c∑  (1) 
where ( )iu c is a standard increasing and concave utility function depending upon 
consumption (or wealth) in each state i  and ip  is the associated probability of that state 
occurring. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) suggested changing both of these components so that the 
objective function becomes 
( ) ( )i i
i
w p v x∑                                                                 (2) 
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replacing the standard utility function with a more general value function and weighting the 
outcomes not by the probabilities but by a function of the probabilities. In this paper, we 
focus on a particular (iso-elastic) form of the value function which depends upon gains and 
losses, x , relative to the initial position: 
 ( )
( )
( ) ( )
if  0
if  0
v x x x
v x
v x x x
α
βλ
+
−
 = ≥= 
= − − <
 (3) 
where λ  measures “direct” loss aversion, defined as the value of a loss of one unit of 
currency, i.e., 1x = − . The parameter α  measures risk attitudes in the domain of gains. 
There is risk aversion in the domain of gains if 1α <  and this increases as α  falls; there is 
risk seeking in the domain of gains if 1α >  and this increases as α  rises. The parameter β  
measures risk attitudes in the domain of losses. There is risk seeking in the domain of losses 
if 1β <  and this increases as β  falls; there is risk aversion in the domain of losses if 1β >  
and this increases as β  rises. There is risk neutrality in the relevant domain when these 
parameters take a value of unity. 
We do not attempt to model the more sophisticated treatment of probabilities embodied in 
Equation (2), i.e., to estimate the weighting function ( )iw p . There are two reasons for this.   
First, existing studies show that the effect of the weighting function is most important when 
probabilities are close to either zero or unity. All our prospects involve probabilities of 0.5 
(i.e., 50:50 outcomes) where the weighting issue appears to be least important. For example, 
Abdellaoui et al (2008) find ( )0.5 0.46w =  in the gain domain and ( )0.5 0.45w =  in the loss 
domain, suggesting we can assume ( )i iw p p≈  without a serious reduction in accuracy. 
Second, there are significant trade-offs that need to be made when calibrating a utility or 
value function using real world data. Studies of behaviour under risk are usually based on 
questionnaires of a relatively small number of homogeneous individuals who are typically 
students of the authors of those studies. For example, Harrison and Swarthout (2016, Table 2) 
list papers testing or estimating models of loss aversion and the last ten of these references 
analyse a total of twelve data sets, nine of which are based on students with a sample size 
ranging from thirty to 177 respondents. The three exceptions are Scholten and Read’s (2014) 
Yale University data set of 569 online respondents (many of whom may also have been 
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students), Abdellaoui et al’s (2013) analysis of 65 couples and von Gaudecker et al’s (2011) 
survey of a representative sample of 1,422 individuals from the Netherlands. 
The advantage of a data set of students is that the respondents are usually willing (indeed 
required) to answer a large number of questions – often about a hundred – which is sufficient 
to identify relatively complicated functional forms of both the value function and the 
weighting function; furthermore, the financial cost of recruiting students is relatively low. 
The corresponding disadvantage is that the study only reveals information on student-aged 
individuals selected for university education and whose understanding of risk may be 
conditioned by what they have already been taught (since they are often Economics, Finance 
or MBA students). Since estimated utility and value functions might be used to analyse the 
savings behaviour of poorly educated individuals or the decumulation behaviour of 
pensioners, estimates of risk or loss aversion from such studies may be inappropriate. 
Our data set is for a representative sample of the UK adult population and contains a large 
number of variables describing the economic, social, political and personal characteristics of 
the respondents. The tradeoff from having access to such a rich data set is that we were 
unable to ask a large number of questions because the agency conducting the survey was 
concerned that if the experiment was too onerous it might put off respondents from 
completing it. We were able to ask sufficient questions to identify the value function but not 
the weighting function.  
To give a flavour of the issues that we consider, we summarise some of our findings in 
Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 illustrates our estimate of the value function for our whole sample, 
ignoring the heterogeneity of respondents: this figure is based entirely on our estimates of ,α  
β  and λ  in Equation (3). These estimated values provide evidence for three stylised facts: 
first, the S-shaped value function posited by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) which is concave 
in both gains and losses; second, the older insight (which can be traced back to Samuelson, 
1963) that the disutility of losses is greater than the utility of gains, commonly known as 
“loss aversion”; and third, that the value function is less concave in losses than it is in gains, 
i.e., β α> , implying that the marginal disutility of losses exceeds the marginal utility of 
gains. 
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Figure 1: The estimated value function for the full sample of respondents 
 
We show that these three qualitative findings hold not only for the whole sample but for any 
sub-sample of the data: for example, they are true for both men and women, at any age, for 
any level of income, for any level of education, etc. However, quantitatively the value 
functions vary considerably by gender, age, income, education, and so on. We summarise 
these differences using a measure of “relative loss aversion” which we define as 
 ( )
( )
( )
( )x
x
v x
x
v x
β
αλΛ
−
+
−
≡ =
−
−  (4) 
which depends not only on the size of direct loss aversion, λ , but, in general, also on the 
sizes of α , β  and x .  Only in the cases of α β=  or 1x = will ( )xΛ  be independent of x  
and equal to direct loss aversion, λ .  
Figure 2 shows our point estimates and 90% confidence intervals for ( )50Λ , estimated 
separately for our data broken down by gender and into six age groups. There is a strong U-
shaped relationship between loss aversion and age; there is also evidence that women have 
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slightly higher loss aversion than men at most ages. It is notable that loss aversion is highest 
among individuals in the age range 18-24, precisely the age group most likely to be analysed 
by studies based on university students. 
Figure 2: Relative loss aversion with a gain or loss of 50 ( ( )50Λ ) across gender and age 
Note: The figure shows the expected value of ( )50Λ and the associated 90% confidence interval. 
While the associations are very strong, we do not claim that they imply a causal relationship 
since we have not controlled for other factors. To address the association of loss aversion 
with reported characteristics, we now turn to a detailed description of our study. In section 2, 
we describe the survey design, elicitation method and sample of respondents. Our results are 
described in section 3 and section 4 concludes. 
Our analysis is closest to that of von Gaudecker et al (2011) who also choose to ignore the 
probability weighting issue. There is, however, an important difference in the value functions 
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between the two studies: whereas our value function is concave for both gains and losses, the 
one used by von Gaudecker et al (2011) is concave for gains but convex for losses.1  
2. Survey design 
2.1 Survey participants 
Our experimental data are taken from a survey conducted online by market research agency 
YouGov from 9th to 17th January 2017. There were 4,018 respondents, of whom 4,016 
successfully completed the questions: the respondents were UK residents over the age of 18. 
Individuals were classified according to 25 profiling characteristics: gender, age, marital 
status, number of children, health status, two personality types, emotional state at the time of 
completing the survey, education, financial knowledge, social class, employment status, 
management responsibility, employment sector, job security, income, home ownership, 
savings, ease of short-term saving, rainy day fund, region, newspaper, political party, 
religion, and religiosity.   
 
 
 
                                                 
1 von Gaudecker et al (2011)’s value function is (taken from Kreps and Porteus (1978)): 
 ( )
( )
( )
1
if  0
1 1
if  0
x
x
v x e x
v x
v x e x
γ
γ
γ
λ
λ γ
+ −
− −
= − ≥
=
−
= − <





  
This differs from the functional form in (3) in three respects: the negative exponential form implies constant 
absolute risk aversion in contrast with constant relative risk aversion implied by the iso-elastic form in (3); the 
value function is concave in gains and convex in losses, implying that disutility increases in losses; and the risk 
aversion parameter, γ , is the same in both the gain and loss domain, similar (but not identical) to imposing 
γ α β= = −  in (3) and implying that the curvature is the same in all outcomes. λ is the loss aversion parameter. 
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Table 1: Survey sample broken down by key profiling characteristics 
Characteristic Full sample UK population 
  Number Per cent Per cent 
Gender 
   Male 1815 45.2% 49% 
Female 2201 54.8% 51% 
Age 
   18-24 350 8.7% 15% 
25-34 438 10.9% 17% 
35-44 630 15.7% 16% 
45-54 837 20.8% 17% 
55-64 939 23.4% 13% 
65 & over 822 20.5% 22% 
Marital status 
   Married/living with partner 2544 63.3% 63% 
Single 1004 25.0% 25% 
Widowed/separated/divorced 468 11.7% 12% 
Employment status 
   Full-time 1644 40.9% 43% 
Part-time 612 15.2% 15% 
Student 184 4.6% 7% 
Retired 1155 28.8% 21% 
Not working 324 8.1% 15% 
No answer 97 2.4% 
Income 
   Below £15,000 1057 26.3% 32% 
£15,000-£29,999 1056 26.3% 30% 
£30,000-£49,999 567 14.1% 12% 
£50,000 & above 208 5.2% 5% 
No answer 1128 28.1% 22% 
Savings 
   Below £1,000 938 23.4% 31% 
£1,000 - £9,999 816 20.3% 23% 
£10,000 - £49,999 690 17.2% 18% 
£50,000 and above 596 14.8% 13% 
No answer 976 24.3% 16% 
Home ownership 
   Own outright 713 40.9% 65% 
Mortgage 610 35.0% 
Rent 420 24.1% 35% 
No answer / don't know 2273 - - 
Note: Sources for UK population: ONS Population Estimates, NOMIS Labour Force Survey, statista.com. 
Income is gross personal income. 
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The first two columns of Table 1 show the representativeness of the sample. Compared with 
the national population, it is marginally (i) underweight young individuals (aged 18-34) and 
overweight middle-aged individuals (aged 45-64), (ii) underweight those on salaries below 
£30,000 and overweight those on salaries above £30,000, and (iii) underweight renters and 
overweight owner-occupiers (obviously these three factors may be related). Surveys of the 
national population covering income and savings also have a lower percentage of “no 
answer” than our survey. 
2.2 Survey design and estimation method 
Throughout the paper, we confine ourselves to the iso-elastic functional form of Equation (3), 
which requires estimation of the three parameters ,α β  and .λ  We use the methodology 
proposed by Abdellaoui et al (2008) which is based on the elicitation of the certainty 
equivalent of a number of different risky prospects, each involving only two equally probable 
outcomes. Abdellaoui et al (2008, p.260) argue that their approach “minimises the cognitive 
burden for subjects by only using certainty equivalents for two-outcome prospects” and also 
suggest that the method is particularly useful where time is limited, which is the case for our 
sample of respondents. 
The estimation is performed in three stages: 
• First, to estimate ,α  respondents are asked to choose prospects in the gain domain 
only, comparing a certain outcome with a prospect containing only gains 
• Second, to estimate ,β  respondents are asked to choose prospects in the loss domain 
only, comparing a certain outcome with a prospect containing only losses 
• Third, respondents are asked to choose prospects with both gains and losses and the 
results are used to estimate λ  conditional on the estimates of α  and β  from the first 
two stages. 
A total of nine prospects (three for gains only, three for losses only and three involving both 
gains and losses) were presented to each individual: these are described in Table 2. 
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Table 2: The prospects presented to each individual 
Gains only Risky prospect Certain prospect 
Prospect 1 50% chance of a gain of £0 and 50% chance of 
a gain of £10 
Certainty 
equivalent, 1G  
Prospect 2 50% chance of a gain of £0 and 50% chance of 
a gain of £100 
Certainty 
equivalent, 2G  
Prospect 3 50% chance of a gain of £0 and 50% chance of 
a gain of £1,000 
Certainty 
equivalent, 3G  
Losses only   
Prospect 4 50% chance of a loss of £0 and 50% chance of a 
loss of £10 
Certainty 
equivalent, 4L  
Prospect 5 50% chance of a loss of £0 and 50% chance of a 
loss of £100 
Certainty 
equivalent, 5L  
Prospect 6 50% chance of a loss of £0 and 50% chance of a 
loss of £1,000 
Certainty 
equivalent, 6L  
Mixed gains and 
losses 
  
Prospect 7 50% chance of a gain of 1G  and 50% chance of 
a loss of 7M  
Certainty 
equivalent, £0 
Prospect 8 50% chance of a gain of 2G  and 50% chance of 
a loss of 8M  
Certainty 
equivalent, £0 
Prospect 9 50% chance of a gain of 3G  and 50% chance of 
a loss of 9M  
Certainty 
equivalent, £0 
 
A detailed description of our method for eliciting preferences can be found in Abdellaoui et 
al (2008, p. 263). For each prospect, the certainty equivalent was obtained by a series of six 
steps using an iterated bisection method requiring the participant to choose either the risky 
prospect or a certain prospect offering a fixed amount. Initially, the fixed amount was set 
equal to the expected value of the risky prospect. In each succeeding iteration, the certain 
prospect was reduced (increased) by 50% of the difference between the values of the risky 
and certain prospects if the respondent’s previous choice had been to accept (reject) the 
certain prospect; the respondent was then asked to choose again. After six iterations, the 
result of this process is an interval in which the certainty equivalent (or indifference value) 
should lie and we took the midpoint of this interval as the estimator of the indifference value. 
The final three prospects involved both gains and losses, and depended on the certainty 
equivalents elicited from Prospects 1, 2 and 3. Thus, in Prospect 7, participants were initially 
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asked to choose between a riskless amount of £0 and a risky prospect offering a 50% chance 
of a gain of 1G  (i.e., the certainty equivalent elicited from Prospect 1) and 50% chance of a 
loss of the same amount. Then, depending on the choice made, the loss amount in the next 
iteration was either increased or decreased (using the same bisection method employed in 
Prospects 1-6). As before, this was repeated for six iterations to elicit the amount 7M  such 
that the individual is indifferent between a riskless amount of £0 and a risky prospect offering 
a 50% chance of a gain of 1G  and a 50% chance of a loss of 7M . This process was then 
repeated for Prospect 8 (using 2G  and eliciting a corresponding loss amount 8M ) and 
Prospect 9 (using 3G  and eliciting a corresponding loss amount 9M ); see third column of 
Table 2. 
The certainty equivalents 1G , 2G  and 3G are related to the prospects in the gain domain as 
follows: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
2 2
3 3
0.5 10 0.5 0 0.5 10
0.5 100 0.5 0 0.5 100
0.5 1000 0.5 0 0.5 1000
v G v v G
v G v v G
v G v v G
α α
α α
α α
= × + × ⇒ = ×
= × + × ⇒ = ×
= × + × ⇒ = ×
 (5) 
which can then be used to estimate the parameter α  by non-linear least squares (NLS). At 
this point, we deviate from Abdellaoui et al (2008) in one important respect. We do not 
attempt to estimate parameters for each individual respondent: this is because we ask each 
respondent fewer questions than Abdellaoui et al (2008). In Appendix A1.2, we show that the 
NLS parameter estimates tend to be biased upwards in very small samples and, to avoid this 
bias, we estimate the value of α  for groups of respondents and not for individuals separately. 
The estimation of β  using prospects 4, 5 and 6 follows an analogous procedure.  
The last step in the process is the estimation of the loss aversion parameter, ,λ which is 
conditional on the estimates for α  and .β  We note that there are two issues with the 
estimates of .λ  The first is econometric: because λ  is estimated in a two-stage procedure, 
where both stages are non-linear, we are much less certain about the small-sample properties 
of the estimates (we calculate the standard errors by bootstrapping). The second is conceptual: 
the absolute value of λ  depends upon the units of measurement (it is homogeneous of degree 
β α−  in the magnitude of gains and losses). This makes comparison of λ parameters across 
different studies problematic: direct comparison is meaningful only when (i) the experiments 
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in the various studies involve very similar magnitudes of gains and losses, or (ii) the studies 
involve similar values of α  and .β   
We will work with the measure of relative loss aversion defined in Equation (4). When 
,β α≠  an individual can be loss averse for some values of x  and loss seeking for other 
values. In our estimation analysis below, in all cases but one2 we find that β α>  and 1:λ ≈
this means that individuals are loss averse (i.e., ( ) 1xΛ > ) if 1x >  and loss seeking (i.e.,
( ) 1xΛ < ) if 1.x <  Since our unit of measurement is the pound sterling, it seems reasonable 
to confine ourselves to values of 1.x >   However, because the function ( )xΛ  is homogenous 
of order β α− , the magnitude of loss aversion also depends upon the size of .x  We report 
our estimates of ( )5Λ , ( )50Λ  and ( )500Λ  – the expected values of the three risky 
prospects – with the associated 90% confidence intervals estimated by boot-strapping. By 
itself, the fact that 1λ ≈  does not imply an absence of loss aversion: whether individuals are 
loss averse depends, as Equation (4) shows, on the values of  ,x ,α and β , as well as .λ  
In the following section, we present estimates of the LA parameters for each individual. 
Before doing this, we consider some further aspects of the experimental design. 
(i) Choice tasks vs. matching tasks 
There are two common experimental procedures for eliciting risk attitudes: choice tasks and 
matching tasks. In a choice tasks approach, subjects are asked to choose between two 
prospects. In a matching tasks approach, subjects are required to “fill in the blank” by stating 
the amount that equates the two options presented (e.g., in Prospect 1 above, individuals must 
choose 1G  which is the certainty equivalent that makes the individuals genuinely indifferent 
to taking the risky prospect (i.e., a 50% chance of a gain of £0 and a 50% chance of a gain of 
£10)).    
                                                 
2 The single counter-example is for the sub-sample of respondents who report their annual income to be above 
£50,000 per year, where 0.7901α =  and 0.7896β = . 
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Frederick et al (2002, p. 387) criticise the choice tasks approach for “simply recovering the 
expectations of the experimenters that guided the experimental design”, because results from 
choice tasks can be easily affected by the choices given.  However, there is also evidence that 
in a matching tasks approach, many subjects “fill in the blank” in a manner that suggests they 
do not really understand what they are doing, especially in cases, as here, when the prospects 
are quite complex (e.g., Bostic et al (1990)). In a previous experiment, we used the matching 
tasks approach in a national population survey. For more than 90% of respondents, the 
responses were inconsistent across different prospects and we were forced to abandon the 
experiment. 
The bisection method of Abdellaoui et al (2008) is a choice tasks approach and, despite the 
valid concern raised by Frederick et al (2002), we feel that this approach is the better of the 
two. This is supported by the fact that now only 16% of the sample gave inconsistent 
responses. 
(ii) Framing effect 
As discussed by Tversky and Kahneman (1981), an individual’s responses to questions can 
be significantly affected by how a given question is “framed”. Framing is, of course, 
unavoidable, but we wanted our questions to be as neutral as possible, so, for example, we 
wanted to avoid using gambling or gaming terms and worded our questions in terms of the 
more neutral “gains” and “losses”, as per Abdellaoui et al (2008). 
(iii) Anchoring effect 
Anchoring is a psychological concept which is used to describe the common human tendency 
to rely too heavily on a particular piece of information when making decisions. As shown by 
Frederick et al. (2002), this suggests that when respondents are asked to make decisions on a 
series of questions, the previous questions faced (and responses given) often influence 
subsequent responses.  
One solution to minimise this would be to ask the questions in a random order. We have nine 
questions arranged in three sets of triples. The third set uses as input the answers to the first 
set which limits the amount of randomness that is feasible across sets. Within each set, the 
gain or loss increases in sequence. We could have randomised the order here, but we felt that 
this could be more confusing to the respondents, given that the bisection procedure is already 
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quite complex. Abdellaoui et al (2008, p.253) also found that their subjects (47 graduate 
students) were less confused if they answered all the gains questions first, followed by all the 
loss questions, ending with the mixed questions (i.e., in the same order as given in Table 2). 
(iv) Real rewards/losses vs. hypothetical rewards/losses 
The survey questions themselves involve “hypothetical” rewards and losses. The use of “real” 
rewards and losses is generally considered desirable, since it brings the experiment closer to 
the real world (Abdellaoui et al, 2007). However, hypothetical rewards/losses have the 
advantage that they allow respondents to be offered a wide range of reward amounts, 
including large gains and losses, which are generally infeasible in studies involving real 
rewards and losses. 
Abdellaoui et al (2008) paid their subjects a fixed fee (€10) to participate in the experiment 
and one subject was, in addition, randomly selected to play out one of the gain questions with 
the actual payment divided by 10. “For ethical and feasibility reasons” (p.252), they did not 
use real losses. The respondents in our study receive a “points based reward” if they fully 
completed the survey. Most previous studies have shown that the results are similar whether 
hypothetical or real rewards (e.g., Beattie and Loomes (1997), Camerer and Hogarth (1999)) 
and losses (e.g., Etchart-Vincent and l’Haridon (2011)) are used. However, Holt and Laury 
(2002) found that the use of real incentives increased risk aversion. 
3. Survey analysis 
3.1 Bivariate analysis 
We analyse the full set of 4,016 survey responses. Among these are some respondents who 
give answers which appear inconsistent, for example 2 1G G< . Respondents with at least one 
such inconsistency comprise 16% of our data set, raising the question of what to do with 
these individuals. One possibility is to accept that they are hopelessly confused and hence 
should be omitted from the analysis. On the other hand, they may merely have made one 
mistake in a particular direction (in the previous example, choosing a value of 2G  which is 
too small) and there may be other individuals who made a mistake in the other direction (i.e., 
2G  too large, but still with 2 1G G> ): omitting the first group would lead to biased estimates. 
As a robustness check, we consider in Appendix 2 a reduced sample which satisfy 
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1 2 3G G G< <  and 4 5 6L L L< <  and it turns out that the question is moot, since the differences 
in the parameter estimates are small (typically about 0.02 for α  and -0.05 for β , indicating 
that the reduced sample is marginally both less risk averse in the gain domain and more risk 
seeking in the loss domain than the full sample). 
In the first part of our analysis, we present estimates of the values of α , β  and λ  both for the 
full sample and for sub-samples of the full sample based on the survey respondents’ 25 
profiling characteristics. These are shown in Table 3.3 It is important to note that none of the 
results in this section necessarily indicate a causal relationship: they are bivariate 
comparisons between  α , β  and λ  and a particular profiling characteristic. Furthermore, the 
measured effect could be influenced by omitted variable bias (failing to control for 
confounding effects, whereby the values of a risk or loss aversion parameter and a particular 
profiling characteristic are jointly determined by a third unidentified factor) or by reverse 
causation (some of the variables such as savings may be determined by α , β  and λ ). 
                                                 
3 Note that nearly all of our potential correlates for α , β  and λ  are categorical variables, either because they 
are truly categorical (e.g., gender) or because of the way that the data were collected (e.g., the question about 
income asked for income in bands). In some cases, we have grouped categories together because the more 
precise categories have a relatively small number of observations. 
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Table 3: Estimated loss aversion parameters for different subgroups of survey respondents (full sample) 
 Characteristic N α β λ Λ(5) Λ(50) Λ(500) 
All 4016 0.685 
(0.005) 
0.833 
(0.008) 
0.956 
(0.011) 
1.21 
(1.16, 1.27) 
1.71 
(1.57, 1.85) 
2.41 
(2.13, 2.70) 
Gender               
Male 1815 0.700 
(0.008) 
0.828 
(0.011) 
0.951 
(0.016) 
1.18 
(1.11, 1.25) 
1.59 
(1.42, 1.77) 
2.15 
(1.82, 2.50) 
Female 2201 0.673 
(0.007) 
0.837 
(0.010) 
0.959 
(0.014) 
1.25 
(1.18, 1.32) 
1.83 
(1.64, 2.03) 
2.68 
(2.26, 3.14) 
equality test  p = 0.013 p = 0.556     
 Age               
18-24 350 0.736 
(0.018) 
0.904 
(0.023) 
1.170 
(0.053) 
1.53 
(1.30, 1.75) 
2.25 
(1.69, 2.90) 
3.33 
(2.20, 4.76) 
25-34 438 0.719 
(0.016) 
0.866 
(0.023) 
1.072 
(0.039) 
1.36 
(1.19, 1.52) 
1.92 
(1.50, 2.36) 
2.72 
(1.93, 3.67) 
35-44 630 0.746 
(0.015) 
0.798 
(0.018) 
0.923 
(0.022) 
1.01 
(0.92, 1.11) 
1.15 
(0.95, 1.37) 
1.31 
(0.98, 1.69) 
45-54 837 0.699 
(0.012) 
0.815 
(0.016) 
0.887 
(0.020) 
1.07 
(0.98, 1.18) 
1.41 
(1.18, 1.70) 
1.85 
(1.41, 2.45) 
55-64 939 0.646 
(0.011) 
0.834 
(0.017) 
0.948 
(0.022) 
1.29 
(1.18, 1.40) 
1.99 
(1.72, 2.32) 
3.09 
(2.46, 3.85) 
65 & over 822 0.635 
(0.011) 
0.831 
(0.018) 
0.943 
(0.022) 
1.29 
(1.16, 1.41) 
2.04 
(1.67, 2.39) 
3.22 
(2.40, 4.08) 
equality test  p = 0.000 p = 0.006     
Age and gender               
M 18-24 151 0.742 
(0.028) 
0.880 
(0.034) 
1.131 
(0.067) 
1.42 
(1.16, 1.76) 
1.98 
(1.30, 2.90) 
2.80 
(1.48, 4.72) 
- 16 - 
 
 Characteristic N α β λ Λ(5) Λ(50) Λ(500) 
 
M 25-34 143 0.751 
(0.029) 
0.888 
(0.041) 
1.015 
(0.069) 
1.31 
(1.03, 1.58) 
1.85 
(1.22, 2.60) 
2.66 
(1.43, 4.29) 
M 35-44 275 0.765 
(0.023) 
0.827 
(0.028) 
0.930 
(0.036) 
1.05 
(0.90, 1.21) 
1.24 
(0.93, 1.62) 
1.47 
(0.96, 2.20) 
M 45-54 401 0.730 
(0.018) 
0.821 
(0.023) 
0.908 
(0.032) 
1.06 
(0.93, 1.23) 
1.33 
(1.04, 1.74) 
1.67 
(1.17, 2.47) 
M 55-64 405 0.644 
(0.017) 
0.808 
(0.023) 
0.953 
(0.039) 
1.24 
(1.06, 1.43) 
1.81 
(1.34, 2.37) 
2.66 
(1.71, 3.95) 
M 65 & over 440 0.660 
(0.016) 
0.817 
(0.023) 
0.933 
(0.030) 
1.20 
(1.06, 1.36) 
1.74 
(1.33, 2.16) 
2.51 
(1.69, 3.47) 
F 18-24 199 0.732 
(0.023) 
0.923 
(0.032) 
1.203 
(0.080) 
1.64 
(1.33, 1.99) 
2.58 
(1.74, 3.64) 
4.10 
(2.28, 6.60) 
F 25-34 295 0.704 
(0.019) 
0.856 
(0.028) 
1.102 
(0.048) 
1.41 
(1.20, 1.63) 
2.03 
(1.50, 2.62) 
2.93 
(1.91, 4.27) 
F 35-44 355 0.732 
(0.019) 
0.777 
(0.022) 
0.919 
(0.029) 
1.01 
(0.89, 1.14) 
1.14 
(0.89, 1.43) 
1.31 
(0.89, 1.80) 
F 45-54 436 0.672 
(0.016) 
0.809 
(0.023) 
0.868 
(0.025) 
1.08 
(0.97, 1.21) 
1.48 
(1.20, 1.81) 
2.04 
(1.46, 2.74) 
F 55-64 534 0.648 
(0.014) 
0.853 
(0.023) 
0.944 
(0.029) 
1.32 
(1.18, 1.48) 
2.14 
(1.70, 2.63) 
3.48 
(2.43, 4.71) 
F 65 & over 382 0.607 
(0.015) 
0.848 
(0.027) 
0.952 
(0.036) 
1.41 
(1.23, 1.61) 
2.47 
(1.87, 3.17) 
4.36 
(2.86, 6.23) 
Marital status               
Married or living with partner 2544 0.681 
(0.007) 
0.829 
(0.010) 
0.944 
(0.013) 
1.20 
(1.14, 1.26) 
1.69 
(1.55, 1.85) 
2.38 
(2.08, 2.72) 
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 Characteristic N α β λ Λ(5) Λ(50) Λ(500) 
Single 1004 0.721 
(0.011) 
0.846 
(0.015) 
1.002 
(0.025) 
1.23 
(1.13, 1.34) 
1.64 
(1.39, 1.95) 
2.20 
(1.70, 2.85) 
Widowed, separated or 
divorced 
468 0.636 
(0.016) 
0.822 
(0.023) 
0.925 
(0.026) 
1.25 
(1.12, 1.39) 
1.93 
(1.54, 2.40) 
3.00 
(2.13, 4.12) 
equality test  p = 0.000 p = 0.553     
Number of children               
No children 2778 0.668 
(0.006) 
0.845 
(0.009) 
0.981 
(0.014) 
1.30 
(1.23, 1.37) 
1.96 
(1.76, 2.16) 
2.96 
(2.53, 3.40) 
One or more children 925 0.730 
(0.012) 
0.808 
(0.015) 
0.909 
(0.017) 
1.03 
(0.96, 1.11) 
1.24 
(1.08, 1.42) 
1.49 
(1.20, 1.81) 
No answer 313 0.713 
(0.021) 
0.796 
(0.026) 
0.909 
(0.033) 
1.05 
(0.91, 1.19) 
1.28 
(0.98, 1.63) 
1.58 
(1.04, 2.25) 
equality test (excl NA)  p = 0.000 p = 0.033     
Health status               
Better than average 1072 0.684 
(0.011) 
0.853 
(0.015) 
0.963 
(0.020) 
1.26 
(1.17, 1.37) 
1.86 
(1.60, 2.17) 
2.75 
(2.19, 3.47) 
Average 2065 0.687 
(0.007) 
0.825 
(0.010) 
0.968 
(0.014) 
1.21 
(1.15, 1.29) 
1.67 
(1.50, 1.87) 
2.30 
(1.96, 2.71) 
Worse than average 879 0.682 
(0.012) 
0.826 
(0.017) 
0.922 
(0.019) 
1.17 
(1.08, 1.26) 
1.65 
(1.41, 1.88) 
2.32 
(1.83, 2.83) 
equality test  p = 0.930 p = 0.279     
Personality type 1               
Type A (competitive) 1202 0.732 
(0.011) 
0.828 
(0.013) 
0.917 
(0.017) 
1.07 
(1.00, 1.15) 
1.34 
(1.16, 1.53) 
1.67 
(1.35, 2.03) 
Type B (laid back) 2814 0.666 
(0.006) 
0.835 
(0.009) 
0.974 
(0.012) 
1.28 
(1.22, 1.34) 
1.89 
(1.73, 2.06) 
2.79 
(2.42, 3.19) 
equality test  p = 0.000 p = 0.691     
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 Characteristic N α β λ Λ(5) Λ(50) Λ(500) 
Personality type 2               
Optimist 2652 0.688 
(0.007) 
0.824 
(0.009) 
0.932 
(0.011) 
1.16 
(1.10, 1.21) 
1.58 
(1.44, 1.73) 
2.16 
(1.88, 2.47) 
Pessimist 1364 0.679 
(0.009) 
0.850 
(0.013) 
1.009 
(0.020) 
1.33 
(1.24, 1.43) 
1.98 
(1.75, 2.25) 
2.94 
(2.45, 3.54) 
equality test  p = 0.425 p = 0.111     
Emotional state               
Tense 343 0.667 
(0.019) 
0.830 
(0.026) 
0.969 
(0.041) 
1.25 
(1.09, 1.48) 
1.82 
(1.39, 2.48) 
2.67 
(1.81, 4.10) 
Neutral 1772 0.673 
(0.008) 
0.850 
(0.012) 
1.002 
(0.019) 
1.33 
(1.25, 1.41) 
2.00 
(1.79, 2.23) 
3.01 
(2.55, 3.54) 
Relaxed 1815 0.700 
(0.008) 
0.821 
(0.011) 
0.921 
(0.015) 
1.12 
(1.04, 1.19) 
1.49 
(1.29, 1.66) 
1.98 
(1.59, 2.33) 
Not sure 86 0.691 
(0.044) 
0.743 
(0.045) 
0.862 
(0.073) 
0.96 
(0.67, 1.27) 
1.13 
(0.56, 1.95) 
1.37 
(0.46, 2.94) 
equality test (excl NS)  p = 0.040 p = 0.204     
Education               
16 & under 1104 0.656 
(0.010) 
0.803 
(0.015) 
0.871 
(0.015) 
1.10 
(1.02, 1.17) 
1.54 
(1.32, 1.74) 
2.16 
(1.70, 2.58) 
17-19 893 0.663 
(0.012) 
0.824 
(0.017) 
0.939 
(0.023) 
1.23 
(1.11, 1.36) 
1.80 
(1.48, 2.14) 
2.65 
(1.97, 3.36) 
20 & over 1298 0.716 
(0.010) 
0.854 
(0.012) 
1.034 
(0.022) 
1.30 
(1.21, 1.41) 
1.80 
(1.59, 2.09) 
2.49 
(2.07, 3.08) 
Other 721 0.703 
(0.013) 
0.852 
(0.018) 
0.994 
(0.028) 
1.27 
(1.15, 1.39) 
1.80 
(1.51, 2.14) 
2.56 
(1.97, 3.31) 
equality test (excl Other)  p = 0.000 p = 0.030     
Financial knowledge               
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 Characteristic N α β λ Λ(5) Λ(50) Λ(500) 
Low 967 0.665 
(0.011) 
0.851 
(0.016) 
0.975 
(0.025) 
1.33 
(1.22, 1.45) 
2.06 
(1.74, 2.44) 
3.21 
(2.50, 4.07) 
Medium 2640 0.684 
(0.007) 
0.820 
(0.009) 
0.948 
(0.013) 
1.18 
(1.13, 1.25) 
1.63 
(1.49, 1.80) 
2.24 
(1.95, 2.59) 
High 409 0.743 
(0.020) 
0.876 
(0.023) 
0.962 
(0.037) 
1.21 
(1.03, 1.40) 
1.68 
(1.25, 2.18) 
2.34 
(1.50, 3.41) 
equality test  p = 0.002 p = 0.035     
Social class               
A 646 0.711 
(0.014) 
0.792 
(0.017) 
0.932 
(0.025) 
1.07 
(0.96, 1.18) 
1.30 
(1.07, 1.57) 
1.59 
(1.17, 2.09) 
B 869 0.686 
(0.011) 
0.857 
(0.016) 
1.006 
(0.023) 
1.32 
(1.22, 1.43) 
1.97 
(1.70, 2.28) 
2.93 
(2.36, 3.67) 
C1 1053 0.710 
(0.010) 
0.845 
(0.014) 
0.988 
(0.022) 
1.24 
(1.15, 1.33) 
1.70 
(1.49, 1.94) 
2.33 
(1.91, 2.83) 
C2 581 0.684 
(0.015) 
0.827 
(0.020) 
0.905 
(0.024) 
1.14 
(1.03, 1.26) 
1.59 
(1.30, 1.91) 
2.24 
(1.65, 2.91) 
D 347 0.655 
(0.017) 
0.813 
(0.027) 
0.944 
(0.033) 
1.22 
(1.06, 1.42) 
1.76 
(1.34, 2.32) 
2.58 
(1.69, 3.81) 
E 390 0.607 
(0.017) 
0.844 
(0.028) 
0.891 
(0.032) 
1.31 
(1.14, 1.52) 
2.27 
(1.69, 2.96) 
3.96 
(2.53, 5.83) 
Not available 130 0.693 
(0.033) 
0.836 
(0.045) 
0.957 
(0.060) 
1.23 
(0.91, 1.52) 
1.76 
(0.95, 2.65) 
2.59 
(0.99, 4.52) 
equality test (excl NA)  p = 0.000 p = 0.093     
Employment status               
Full-time 1644 0.733 
(0.009) 
0.835 
(0.011) 
0.959 
(0.017) 
1.13 
(1.05, 1.20) 
1.43 
(1.25, 1.61) 
1.81 
(1.48, 2.16) 
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 Characteristic N α β λ Λ(5) Λ(50) Λ(500) 
Part-time 612 0.685 
(0.014) 
0.810 
(0.018) 
0.928 
(0.025) 
1.15 
(1.04, 1.29) 
1.56 
(1.28, 1.90) 
2.11 
(1.56, 2.80) 
Student 184 0.726 
(0.025) 
0.933 
(0.034) 
1.214 
(0.082) 
1.70 
(1.38, 2.07) 
2.77 
(1.89, 3.89) 
4.55 
(2.56, 7.26) 
Retired 1155 0.635 
(0.010) 
0.819 
(0.015) 
0.929 
(0.019) 
1.25 
(1.15, 1.36) 
1.91 
(1.64, 2.23) 
2.92 
(2.33, 3.67) 
Not working 324 0.629 
(0.016) 
0.860 
(0.028) 
0.967 
(0.037) 
1.41 
(1.24, 1.62) 
2.42 
(1.86, 3.14) 
4.18 
(2.75, 6.13) 
No answer 97 0.634 
(0.032) 
0.832 
(0.054) 
0.980 
(0.071) 
1.37 
(1.04, 1.81) 
2.26 
(1.27, 3.82) 
3.82 
(1.55, 8.04) 
equality test (only FT, PT, 
NW) 
 p = 0.000 p = 0.282     
Management responsibility               
Owner, etc 300 0.699 
(0.021) 
0.808 
(0.027) 
0.981 
(0.037) 
1.17 
(1.00, 1.34) 
1.52 
(1.10, 1.93) 
1.99 
(1.21, 2.80) 
Senior manager 145 0.745 
(0.034) 
0.809 
(0.033) 
0.898 
(0.050) 
1.01 
(0.83, 1.27) 
1.19 
(0.79, 1.81) 
1.44 
(0.75, 2.58) 
Middle manager 302 0.759 
(0.020) 
0.762 
(0.023) 
0.868 
(0.025) 
0.87 
(0.77, 0.99) 
0.89 
(0.69, 1.12) 
0.90 
(0.63, 1.27) 
Junior manager 443 0.718 
(0.017) 
0.869 
(0.022) 
0.978 
(0.034) 
1.25 
(1.10, 1.41) 
1.77 
(1.39, 2.23) 
2.53 
(1.75, 3.50) 
No management 
responsibility 
1073 0.701 
(0.010) 
0.846 
(0.015) 
0.980 
(0.021) 
1.24 
(1.15, 1.35) 
1.74 
(1.51, 2.03) 
2.44 
(1.98, 3.09) 
Other / NA 1753 0.649 
(0.008) 
0.835 
(0.012) 
0.955 
(0.016) 
1.28 
(1.20, 1.36) 
1.96 
(1.73, 2.19) 
3.00 
(2.49, 3.52) 
equality test (excl Oth/NA)  p = 0.078  p = 0.008     
Employment sector               
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 Characteristic N α β λ Λ(5) Λ(50) Λ(500) 
Self-employed 375 0.673 
(0.018) 
0.815 
(0.024) 
0.994 
(0.035) 
1.26 
(1.09, 1.42) 
1.76 
(1.36, 2.20) 
2.47 
(1.66, 3.39) 
Private sector 1231 0.710 
(0.010) 
0.814 
(0.013) 
0.932 
(0.017) 
1.10 
(1.03, 1.18) 
1.41 
(1.22, 1.62) 
1.80 
(1.45, 2.22) 
Public corporation 533 0.698 
(0.015) 
0.844 
(0.020) 
0.944 
(0.030) 
1.19 
(1.05, 1.33) 
1.67 
(1.31, 2.05) 
2.36 
(1.63, 3.17) 
Public sector 465 0.667 
(0.015) 
0.867 
(0.023) 
0.983 
(0.030) 
1.35 
(1.22, 1.52) 
2.15 
(1.74, 2.64) 
3.43 
(2.51, 4.60) 
Charity sector 211 0.672 
(0.023) 
0.870 
(0.034) 
1.010 
(0.051) 
1.40 
(1.15, 1.62) 
2.23 
(1.54, 2.94) 
3.60 
(2.10, 5.41) 
Other / NA 1201 0.668 
(0.010) 
0.834 
(0.014) 
0.957 
(0.020) 
1.25 
(1.15, 1.36) 
1.83 
(1.55, 2.14) 
2.69 
(2.09, 3.39) 
equality test (excl Oth/NA)  p = 0.094 p = 0.181     
Job security               
Secure 1781 0.723 
(0.008) 
0.836 
(0.011) 
0.956 
(0.016) 
1.14 
(1.07, 1.21) 
1.48 
(1.31, 1.66) 
1.92 
(1.59, 2.27) 
Insecure 475 0.707 
(0.017) 
0.801 
(0.021) 
0.930 
(0.030) 
1.09 
(0.95, 1.25) 
1.37 
(1.07, 1.74) 
1.74 
(1.21, 2.44) 
No answer 1760 0.643 
(0.008) 
0.839 
(0.012) 
0.962 
(0.016) 
1.32 
(1.24, 1.40) 
2.07 
(1.84, 2.34) 
3.26 
(2.74, 3.87) 
equality test (excl NA)  p = 0.389 p = 0.135     
Income               
Below £15,000 1057 0.649 
(0.010) 
0.845 
(0.015) 
0.966 
(0.021) 
1.32 
(1.22, 1.42) 
2.07 
(1.78, 2.37) 
3.26 
(2.61, 4.02) 
£15,000-£29,999 1056 0.678 
(0.010) 
0.832 
(0.015) 
0.975 
(0.020) 
1.25 
(1.16, 1.33) 
1.78 
(1.56, 1.99) 
2.54 
(2.09, 2.98) 
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 Characteristic N α β λ Λ(5) Λ(50) Λ(500) 
£30,000-£49,999 567 0.746 
(0.015) 
0.827 
(0.019) 
0.931 
(0.026) 
1.06 
(0.97, 1.18) 
1.29 
(1.07, 1.57) 
1.56 
(1.18, 2.10) 
£50,000 & above 208 0.790 
(0.027) 
0.790 
(0.028) 
0.897 
(0.037) 
0.90 
(0.75, 1.07) 
0.90 
(0.63, 1.26) 
0.92 
(0.52, 1.48) 
No answer 1128 0.679 
(0.010) 
0.833 
(0.015) 
0.952 
(0.019) 
1.21 
(1.13, 1.31) 
1.71 
(1.50, 1.99) 
2.43 
(1.99, 3.02) 
equality test (excl NA)  p = 0.000 p = 0.387     
Home ownership               
Own outright 713 0.654 
(0.013) 
0.850 
(0.020) 
0.956 
(0.028) 
1.31 
(1.18, 1.45) 
2.06 
(1.66, 2.49) 
3.24 
(2.37, 4.28) 
Mortgage 610 0.694 
(0.014) 
0.816 
(0.018) 
0.962 
(0.025) 
1.19 
(1.08, 1.31) 
1.60 
(1.34, 1.93) 
2.15 
(1.64, 2.84) 
Rent 420 0.669 
(0.018) 
0.798 
(0.024) 
0.907 
(0.032) 
1.12 
(0.97, 1.29) 
1.53 
(1.15, 1.99) 
2.09 
(1.35, 3.09) 
No answer / don't know 2273 0.696 
(0.007) 
0.839 
(0.010) 
0.964 
(0.013) 
1.22 
(1.15, 1.28) 
1.70 
(1.52, 1.88) 
2.38 
(2.01, 2.74) 
equality test (excl NA/DK)  p = 0.104 p = 0.213     
Savings               
Below £1,000 938 0.689 
(0.011) 
0.814 
(0.016) 
0.922 
(0.018) 
1.13 
(1.04, 1.24) 
1.52 
(1.28, 1.81) 
2.04 
(1.57, 2.65) 
£1,000 - £9,999 816 0.708 
(0.012) 
0.841 
(0.016) 
0.970 
(0.026) 
1.21 
(1.12, 1.33) 
1.66 
(1.43, 1.98) 
2.28 
(1.83, 2.97) 
£10,000 - £49,999 690 0.672 
(0.012) 
0.830 
(0.017) 
1.026 
(0.026) 
1.32 
(1.21, 1.45) 
1.90 
(1.62, 2.26) 
2.75 
(2.15, 3.53) 
£50,000 and above 596 0.712 
(0.014) 
0.842 
(0.020) 
0.937 
(0.026) 
1.16 
(1.04, 1.28) 
1.57 
(1.26, 1.90) 
2.14 
(1.53, 2.84) 
- 23 - 
 
 Characteristic N α β λ Λ(5) Λ(50) Λ(500) 
No answer 976 0.655 
(0.011) 
0.841 
(0.016) 
0.947 
(0.022) 
1.28 
(1.16, 1.40) 
1.97 
(1.62, 2.32) 
3.04 
(2.26, 3.86) 
equality test (excl NA)  p = 0.098 p = 0.620     
Ease of short-term saving               
Easy 2488 0.686 
(0.007) 
0.834 
(0.010) 
0.960 
(0.013) 
1.23 
(1.17, 1.29) 
1.74 
(1.59, 1.90) 
2.46 
(2.17, 2.80) 
Not easy 1528 0.684 
(0.009) 
0.831 
(0.012) 
0.949 
(0.017) 
1.20 
(1.12, 1.27) 
1.68 
(1.46, 1.89) 
2.36 
(1.91, 2.81) 
equality test  p = 0.861 p = 0.832     
Rainy day fund               
Yes 2719 0.677 
(0.006) 
0.842 
(0.009) 
0.979 
(0.013) 
1.28 
(1.22, 1.34) 
1.87 
(1.70, 2.04) 
2.74 
(2.38, 3.12) 
No 1297 0.702 
(0.010) 
0.814 
(0.013) 
0.915 
(0.017) 
1.10 
(1.02, 1.19) 
1.42 
(1.24, 1.64) 
1.85 
(1.50, 2.27) 
equality test  p = 0.039 p = 0.081     
Region               
North East 174 0.678 
(0.024) 
0.809 
(0.033) 
0.925 
(0.044) 
1.15 
(0.96, 1.38) 
1.57 
(1.09, 2.24) 
2.17 
(1.24, 3.66) 
North West 490 0.670 
(0.014) 
0.816 
(0.021) 
0.964 
(0.032) 
1.23 
(1.10, 1.37) 
1.74 
(1.39, 2.09) 
2.47 
(1.78, 3.23) 
Yorkshire and the Humber 370 0.676 
(0.017) 
0.820 
(0.024) 
0.942 
(0.033) 
1.20 
(1.05, 1.35) 
1.71 
(1.30, 2.08) 
2.43 
(1.60, 3.24) 
East Midlands 292 0.675 
(0.019) 
0.860 
(0.029) 
1.036 
(0.044) 
1.39 
(1.19, 1.59) 
2.14 
(1.61, 2.74) 
3.30 
(2.18, 4.76) 
West Midlands 300 0.725 
(0.021) 
0.865 
(0.029) 
0.950 
(0.039) 
1.20 
(1.02, 1.38) 
1.67 
(1.25, 2.24) 
2.35 
(1.51, 3.63) 
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 Characteristic N α β λ Λ(5) Λ(50) Λ(500) 
East of England 352 0.677 
(0.018) 
0.857 
(0.026) 
0.970 
(0.038) 
1.30 
(1.12, 1.49) 
1.98 
(1.52, 2.53) 
3.03 
(2.05, 4.33) 
London 509 0.709 
(0.017) 
0.825 
(0.021) 
0.920 
(0.025) 
1.11 
(1.00, 1.24) 
1.45 
(1.18, 1.80) 
1.90 
(1.39, 2.61) 
South East 499 0.671 
(0.014) 
0.842 
(0.022) 
1.009 
(0.033) 
1.33 
(1.15, 1.53) 
1.99 
(1.52, 2.57) 
2.99 
(1.99, 4.34) 
South West 343 0.685 
(0.018) 
0.866 
(0.027) 
0.971 
(0.038) 
1.29 
(1.13, 1.53) 
1.96 
(1.49, 2.68) 
2.99 
(1.96, 4.74) 
Wales 192 0.662 
(0.023) 
0.771 
(0.032) 
0.939 
(0.041) 
1.13 
(0.96, 1.35) 
1.48 
(1.09, 2.04) 
1.95 
(1.21, 3.07) 
Scotland 391 0.703 
(0.019) 
0.818 
(0.024) 
0.906 
(0.032) 
1.10 
(0.93, 1.24) 
1.44 
(1.05, 1.83) 
1.90 
(1.19, 2.70) 
Northern Ireland 104 0.674 
(0.038) 
0.818 
(0.051) 
0.949 
(0.069) 
1.22 
(0.95, 1.65) 
1.76 
(1.01, 3.14) 
2.62 
(1.09, 5.99) 
equality test (excl oth)  p = 0.495 p = 0.505     
Newspaper               
Express / Mail 560 0.678 
(0.015) 
0.796 
(0.020) 
0.907 
(0.024) 
1.10 
(0.96, 1.21) 
1.45 
(1.11, 1.76) 
1.92 
(1.28, 2.56) 
Sun / Star 571 0.672 
(0.014) 
0.807 
(0.020) 
0.867 
(0.023) 
1.08 
(0.99, 1.20) 
1.48 
(1.24, 1.79) 
2.04 
(1.55, 2.69) 
Mirror / Record 402 0.701 
(0.018) 
0.807 
(0.025) 
0.854 
(0.024) 
1.01 
(0.89, 1.13) 
1.30 
(0.99, 1.61) 
1.67 
(1.09, 2.31) 
Guardian / Independent 378 0.670 
(0.015) 
0.892 
(0.024) 
1.214 
(0.046) 
1.74 
(1.53, 1.98) 
2.93 
(2.29, 3.71) 
4.94 
(3.39, 6.96) 
FT / Times / Telegraph 316 0.763 
(0.021) 
0.830 
(0.025) 
0.950 
(0.035) 
1.07 
(0.91, 1.23) 
1.27 
(0.95, 1.64) 
1.51 
(0.97, 2.20) 
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 Characteristic N α β λ Λ(5) Λ(50) Λ(500) 
Other paper 419 0.687 
(0.017) 
0.840 
(0.022) 
0.980 
(0.033) 
1.25 
(1.09, 1.42) 
1.79 
(1.37, 2.26) 
2.58 
(1.72, 3.56) 
No paper 1370 0.675 
(0.009) 
0.850 
(0.014) 
1.005 
(0.022) 
1.32 
(1.22, 1.43) 
1.96 
(1.69, 2.29) 
2.92 
(2.35, 3.66) 
equality test  p = 0.006 p = 0.027     
Political party               
Conservative 950 0.710 
(0.011) 
0.828 
(0.015) 
0.945 
(0.019) 
1.15 
(1.06, 1.25) 
1.52 
(1.30, 1.79) 
2.02 
(1.60, 2.55) 
Labour 1339 0.685 
(0.010) 
0.828 
(0.013) 
0.929 
(0.018) 
1.17 
(1.10, 1.27) 
1.64 
(1.42, 1.90) 
2.29 
(1.86, 2.83) 
Liberal Democrat 333 0.657 
(0.017) 
0.888 
(0.027) 
1.113 
(0.047) 
1.63 
(1.40, 1.89) 
2.81 
(2.14, 3.67) 
4.89 
(3.24, 7.12) 
SNP or Plaid Cymru 100 0.729 
(0.039) 
0.808 
(0.046) 
0.893 
(0.065) 
1.02 
(0.77, 1.32) 
1.27 
(0.71, 2.01) 
1.61 
(0.65, 3.07) 
Other party 351 0.654 
(0.018) 
0.847 
(0.028) 
0.963 
(0.039) 
1.31 
(1.12, 1.53) 
2.06 
(1.53, 2.68) 
3.25 
(2.09, 4.71) 
No party 760 0.679 
(0.013) 
0.813 
(0.017) 
0.962 
(0.026) 
1.20 
(1.08, 1.32) 
1.65 
(1.36, 1.97) 
2.27 
(1.69, 2.92) 
Don't know / NA 183 0.678 
(0.026) 
0.862 
(0.040) 
1.003 
(0.062) 
1.38 
(1.12, 1.75) 
2.17 
(1.43, 3.39) 
3.47 
(1.84, 6.66) 
equality test (excl DK/NA)  p = 0.028 p = 0.265     
Religion               
None 498 0.707 
(0.017) 
0.832 
(0.023) 
0.950 
(0.033) 
1.16 
(1.02, 1.34) 
1.56 
(1.19, 2.03) 
2.09 
(1.39, 3.06) 
Ch of England 560 0.649 
(0.014) 
0.812 
(0.020) 
0.914 
(0.026) 
1.19 
(1.07, 1.33) 
1.74 
(1.40, 2.14) 
2.55 
(1.83, 3.46) 
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 Characteristic N α β λ Λ(5) Λ(50) Λ(500) 
Roman Catholic 171 0.681 
(0.029) 
0.817 
(0.040) 
0.898 
(0.049) 
1.13 
(0.91, 1.37) 
1.57 
(1.05, 2.33) 
2.23 
(1.19, 3.98) 
Protestant 158 0.617 
(0.023) 
0.829 
(0.032) 
1.047 
(0.056) 
1.46 
(1.25, 1.76) 
2.39 
(1.76, 3.32) 
3.92 
(2.42, 6.14) 
Other 121 0.656 
(0.030) 
0.822 
(0.040) 
0.988 
(0.060) 
1.31 
(1.07, 1.58) 
1.96 
(1.30, 2.84) 
2.98 
(1.58, 5.23) 
NA 2508 0.695 
(0.007) 
0.840 
(0.010) 
0.965 
(0.014) 
1.22 
(1.16, 1.29) 
1.70 
(1.54, 1.88) 
2.38 
(2.05, 2.75) 
equality test (NA)  p = 0.017 p = 0.975     
Religiosity               
Religious 843 0.644 
(0.011) 
0.811 
(0.017) 
0.925 
(0.022) 
1.22 
(1.11, 1.35) 
1.80 
(1.50, 2.18) 
2.67 
(2.03, 3.53) 
Not religious 904 0.705 
(0.012) 
0.837 
(0.016) 
0.957 
(0.024) 
1.19 
(1.07, 1.30) 
1.62 
(1.34, 1.92) 
2.21 
(1.67, 2.87) 
Don't know / NA 2269 0.693 
(0.007) 
0.839 
(0.010) 
0.967 
(0.012) 
1.23 
(1.18, 1.28) 
1.72 
(1.57, 1.87) 
2.41 
(2.10, 2.74) 
equality test (excl DK/NA)   p = 0.000 p = 0.261         
Note:  The table presents results for the full sample of 4,016 respondents. N = number of respondents with each characteristic, α  = degree of risk aversion in the domain of 
gains, β  = degree of risk aversion in the domain of losses, λ  = direct loss aversion (i.e., when the loss 1x = − ),  and ( )xΛ  is relative loss aversion comparing a loss of 
x  with a gain of x  (see Equation (4)), where x  = 5, 50 and 500. The null hypothesis for the equality test is that the parameters are equal across the categories of each 
characteristic and the null is rejected if the p-value is below the required significance level and accepted if it is above.  
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(i) Overall 
We start by estimating the parameters for the entire sample. Our point estimate for α  is 0.685 
and for β  it is 0.833: combined with an estimate of λ  of 0.956, these are the estimates used 
to plot Figure 1 above. The α  and β  estimates are much lower than those reported by 
Abdellaoui et al (2008) who get median individual estimates of 0.86 and 1.06, which are 
respectively 26% and 27% higher than our estimates. As previously mentioned, this may be 
due to a small sample upward bias from estimating the parameters at the individual level 
when there are only a relatively small number of questions per individual. Also as previously 
discussed, the estimates of λ  are homogeneous of degree β α−  and cannot be easily 
compared: for this reason, we do not view the difference between our estimated λ  value 
close to unity with the median value of 2.61 reported by Abdellaoui et al (2008) as 
informative.  
One of the most striking results is that in all cases, β α> , meaning that the marginal 
disutility of a loss exceeds the marginal utility of a gain. Despite the finding that 1λ ≈ , the 
fact that β α>  implies individuals are loss averse (i.e. ( ) 1xΛ > ) when x  is larger than unity, 
effectively for all non-trivial values. We find, for example, ( )500 2.41Λ = , which means that 
the loss of £500 causes 2.41 times more unhappiness than a gain of £50 would cause 
happiness.  
These results have been obtained by estimating the preference parameters from the sample as 
a whole but, as we noted in the Introduction, the parameters vary for different groups of 
people. We now proceed to look at the association between the preference parameters and 
individual characteristics on a characteristic-by-characteristic basis. 
(ii) Gender  
The vast majority of studies show that, on average, women are more risk averse than men, 
particularly when it comes to financial investments (e.g., Bajtelsmit and Bernasek (1996), 
Powell and Ansic (1997), Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998), Schubert et al. (1999), Finucane 
et al. (2000), Borghans et al. (2009), Croson and Gneezy (2009), Dohmen et al. (2011), and 
Sarin and Wieland (2012)). However, Filippin and Crosetto (2016) and Nelson (2017) review 
the more recent literature on gender differences in risk aversion and find that there is little 
conclusive evidence for a difference or that any difference is small.  
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Barber and Odean (2001) explain the observation that women are more risk averse than men 
in terms of men being more confident than women.  A survey by Scottish Friendly (2018) 
found that 45% of men were either “very” or “extremely confident” about managing their 
finances, compared with 31% of women. We also find that, on average, women in the UK 
have greater risk aversion in the domain of gains than men: the median female 0 673α .=  is 
lower than the median male 0 700α . .= This difference is statistically significant with a p-
value of 0.013, but is economically quite small. The differences in the parameter estimates 
for β  and λ  are even smaller and not statistically significant for the former. Nevertheless, 
when looking at relative loss aversion, ( )50Λ  is 1.81 for females and 1.58 for males, and 
this difference is statistically significant. The Scottish Friendly survey found that women 
were more afraid of losing money than men.  
(iii) Age 
There is an extensive literature assessing whether risk aversion changes with age. Most 
studies show that young adults and very old people tend to be risk averse. Between these 
ages, risk aversion initially falls before rising again following a U-shaped pattern (e.g., Riley 
and Chow (1992), Bakshi and Chen (1994), and Pålsson (1996)). More recent studies give 
mixed results: some show that older people can be more risk averse than younger adults (e.g., 
Albert and Duffy (2012) and Bonsang and Dohmen (2015)), others show that older people 
can be more risk seeking than younger adults (e.g., Kellen et al. (2017)), while others show 
that there are no clear age-related differences as a function of choice framing, e.g., in terms of 
gains vs. losses (e.g., Mata et al. (2011)). 
Table 3 shows the parameter estimates for age groups 18−24, 25–34, 35−44, 45−54, 55–64 
and 65 and over.  The α estimates have a broad hump-shaped pattern, with a peak (implying 
risk aversion in the domain of gains is lowest) in early middle age (35-44). In higher age 
ranges, it declines uniformly. It is lower in lower age ranges, although 18-24 year olds are 
less risk averse than 25-34 year olds. These differences are statistically significant. The β
estimates exhibit a U-shaped pattern, with the lowest value (indicating that risk seeking in the 
domain of losses is greatest) in the 35-44 age range. The value is highest, indicating the 
lowest willingness to take risks in the loss domain, in the 18-24 year age range. Again, these 
differences are statistically significant.  The estimated loss aversion parameter, ,λ  also has a 
U-shaped pattern, reaching a minimum in later middle age (45-54). It is highest with 18-24 
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year olds. So our survey respondents appear to be both less risk averse and less loss averse, as 
well as more risk seeking if facing losses, in middle age than at earlier or later ages. This is 
consistent with existing evidence.  
Looking at the results by age and gender, Table 3 and Figure 2 suggest that women are more 
risk averse in the gain domain than men in the same age group, except marginally for the 55-
64 age group. However, women appear to be more risk seeking in the loss domain than men 
between the ages of 24 and 55 and also less loss averse between 35 and 64. 
(iv) Marital status  
The degree of risk aversion can also be influenced by marital status. Sung and Hanna (1996), 
Grable and Lytton (1998), Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998, 2006), and Yao and Hanna 
(2005) provide evidence that single women are more risk averse than single men or married 
couples. Hallahan et al. (2003) argue that married couples have greater capacity to absorb 
undesirable outcomes than singles. However, when married couples are analysed separately, 
single women are more risk averse than married men, but less risk averse than married 
women. Some studies find that single people actually take more risks (e.g., Cohn et al. 
(1975), Dohmen et al. (2011) and Roussanov and Savor (2014)). 
Our data set indicates that widowed, divorced and separated people are the most risk averse 
in the gain domain, while single people are the least, with partnered people4 lying between; 
the differences are statistically significant. Since the existing literature has not previously 
examined widowed, divorced and separated people, this would appear to be a new finding.  
We offer the following possible explanations: they could have (i) experienced a sharp and 
sudden fall in income, (ii) to provide for dependants (both younger and older) and (iii) 
become more cautious as a result of their negative experience. On the other hand, their risk 
seeking behaviour in the loss domain is greater than the other two groups (although the 
difference is not significant), and they appear to be less loss averse. 
 
                                                 
4 Married/living with partner, including “civil partnership”. 
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(v) Number of children  
Having children tends to be associated with higher risk aversion according to Chaulk et al. 
(2003), Hallahan et al. (2004) and Gilliam et al. (2010). However, our study shows people 
without children are more risk averse in the gain domain, less risk taking in the loss domain, 
and more loss averse overall than people with children. On the face of it, this result might 
seem surprising. One might have thought that having children would make people more loss 
averse. But the causality could be the other way around: people who are both risk and loss 
averse might decide not to have children.  
(vi)  Health status 
Risk attitudes in both domains of gains and losses do not appear to depend on self-reported 
health status: note that the question explicitly asked respondents to report their health status 
compared to people of the same age, so this should not be confounded with age effects. 
However, loss aversion is much lower for people in poor health than for people with average 
or above average health.   
(vii)  Personality type 1: Type A vs Type B 
The first personality type variable contrasts individuals who are competitive, outgoing, 
ambitious, impatient or aggressive with those who are more laid back. Type A competitive 
personalities are both less loss averse and less risk averse in the gain domain than Type B 
laid-back personalities. There is, however, no difference in risk seeking behaviour in the loss 
domain.   
(viii) Personality type 2: Optimists vs pessimists 
There is also no difference in the risk attitudes of optimists and pessimists, although 
pessimists are significantly more loss averse than optimists. 
(ix) Emotional state  
Individuals who report that they were tense at the beginning of the survey have higher risk 
aversion than those in a neutral or relaxed state. However, those in a neutral state are both 
less risk seeking in the loss domain and more loss averse than those in other groups.  
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(x) Education  
Individuals with higher levels of general education or higher IQs tend to be more risk tolerant 
(e.g., Grable (2000) and Grinblatt et al (2011)). This is strongly reinforced if individuals also 
have a high degree of financial literacy (Behrman et al (2012), and Lusardi and Mitchell 
(2014)). Bluethgen et al (2008) find that financial advice can also help to overcome risk 
aversion, especially for women, and lead to more diversified portfolios that are better targeted 
to achieving an investor’s goals.  
In our sample, there is an interesting mixture of results. Risk aversion in the gain domain falls 
with higher levels of general education, consistent with existing evidence. Risk seeking in the 
loss domain also falls, but loss aversion increases with terminal education age.   
(xi) Financial knowledge  
The degree of financial knowledge has a significant impact on risk and loss attitudes, 
unsurprisingly. Individuals reporting a high level of financial knowledge – just 10% of the 
sample – have both significantly lower risk aversion in the gain domain and risk seeking in 
the loss domain than those reporting medium and low financial knowledge.  However, the 
differences in loss aversion, λ , are not significant across the three groups. Nevertheless, the 
differences in α  and β  mean that relative loss aversion is much higher for those with low 
financial knowledge than for the other two groups. 
(xii) Social class5  
Individuals from higher social classes generally have higher values of α  and lower values of 
β  (statistically significant in both cases), suggesting that they are less risk averse in the gain 
                                                 
5 Social class definitions are: A - Higher professional and managerial occupations; B - Lower managerial and 
professional occupations; C1 - Supervisory, clerical and administrative occupations; small employers and own 
account workers; C2 - Lower supervisory and technical occupations; skilled manual workers; D - Semi and 
unskilled manual workers, semi-routine and routine occupations, casual workers; E - Never worked and long-
term unemployed. Sources: NRS classifications, www.nrs.co.uk/nrs-print/lifestyle-and-classification-
data/social-grade/; 
webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20010627021525/http://www.statistics.gov.uk:80/methods_quality/ns_sec/  
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domain and more risk seeking in the loss domain than those from lower social classes. 
Members of social class A have the lowest degree of relative loss aversion, Λ . For example, 
for £10x = , their (10)Λ  at 1.36 is half that of members of social class E at 2.64. An outlier 
in this pattern is social class B whose members from the lower managerial and professional 
occupations are much more risk and loss averse than members of neighbouring social classes: 
their (10)Λ  at 2.21 is the second highest after social class E. 
(xiii) Employment status 
Employment status has a big and predictable effect on the parameter estimates. Those not 
working (including the unemployed), those classified as other/no answer and retired people 
have the greatest risk aversion in the gain domain, and full-time workers and students the 
lowest, with part-time workers in between. Yet, part-time workers are the most risk seeking 
in the loss domain and students the least. Consistent with this, part-time workers are the least 
loss averse and students the most.    
(xiv) Management responsibility 
In terms of management responsibility, there is a hump-shaped pattern in α  values, with 
business owners and those without management responsibility being more risk averse in the 
gain domain than managers.  In turn, senior and junior managers are more risk averse than 
middle managers, although the differences are not statistically significant. Middle managers 
are also more risk seeking in the loss domain than other groups and now the difference is 
significant. This is followed by owners and senior managers, with junior managers and those 
without managerial responsibility being the least willing to take such risks, consistent with 
the social class findings. Middle managers’ direct loss aversion, λ , is also significantly lower 
than all other groups, so low, in fact, that their relative loss aversion, ( )xΛ , is independent of 
the size of x .6  
 
                                                 
6 The technical reason why this holds is that their α  and β  parameters are approximately equal, so that  their 
( )x λΛ =  for all x . This is what Tversky and Kahneman (1992) found for their group of graduate students.  
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(xv) Employment sector 
Public and charity sector workers are the most risk averse in the gain domain, the least risk 
seeking in the loss domain and the most loss averse of all groups of workers. The self-
employed are also risk averse in gains, but are amongst the most risk seeking in the loss 
domain, and are much less loss averse than public and charity sector workers.  Private sector 
employees (followed by those working for public corporations) have the lowest risk aversion 
in the gain domain, are amongst the most risk seeking in the loss domain, and have the lowest 
loss aversion. It is possible that an individual’s risk attitude and employment sector are 
jointly determined: for example, someone who is risk averse chooses to work in the public 
sector. 
(xvi) Job security 
Job security has no effect on risk attitudes. 
(xvii) Income (gross personal) 
Most studies suggest that risk aversion decreases with higher income and wealth, controlling 
for other factors, such as gender, age, education and financial knowledge (e.g., Riley and 
Chow (1992), Grable (2000), Hartog et al. (2002), Campbell (2006), Guiso and Paiella 
(2008), and Grinblatt et al. (2011)). However, individuals who are more likely to face income 
uncertainty or to become liquidity constrained exhibit a higher degree of risk aversion (Guiso 
and Paiella (2008)). Similarly, individuals become more risk averse after a negative shock to 
wealth, such as a reduction in the value of their home (Paravisini et al. (2017)). We look at 
income in this sub-section and different measures of wealth in the following two sub-
sections. 
Risk aversion in the gain domain falls monotonically as income increases. By contrast, risk 
seeking behaviour in the loss domain increases monotonically as income increases.  Our 
study shows the importance of income in determining the degree of direct loss aversion, λ , 
which generally falls as income increases: it is above the national average (0.956) for 
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incomes below £30,000, and below for incomes above £30,000.7  However, relative loss 
aversion, ( )xΛ , falls monotonically as income rises. 
(xviii) Home ownership 
In terms of home ownership, relative loss aversion is lowest for those who rent, next highest 
for those with a mortgage, and highest for those who own their home outright. However, 
these differences are not statistically significant, since there is no significant difference in  α ,  
β  or λ  across the three groups. In short, the extent of home ownership appears to have little 
effect on risk and loss attitudes. 
(xix) Savings 
For savings, we observe a hump-shaped pattern for λ : it is low at low levels of savings 
(below £1,000), but then increases as the level of savings increases, reaching a peak for 
savings in the range £10,000 to £49,999, but is then much lower for savings of £50,000 and 
above.  Those with little savings have little to lose and this is reflected in a relatively low .λ  
This group also has the lowest β  parameter, indicating the strongest risk seeking behaviour 
in the domain of losses. The β  parameter is highest for those with savings above £50,000, 
suggesting that this group is the least willing to take risks in the face of losses. But the pattern 
in between is non-monotonic. The α  parameters exhibit a similar wave like pattern as the β  
parameters. The lowest α  parameters (the most risk averse in the gain domain) are for those 
with savings below £1,000 or between £10,000 and £49,999. The highest α  parameters (the 
least risk averse in the gain domain) are for those with savings between £1,000 and £9,999 or 
above £50,000.  The differences in the α  parameters are statistically significant, while the 
differences in the β  parameters are not. 
                                                 
7 This figure is just above median earnings at the time of the survey. In April 2017, median gross annual 
earnings for full-time employees in the UK were £28,600 
(https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/earningsandworkinghours/bulletins/annual
surveyofhoursandearnings/2017provisionaland2016revisedresults). 
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We should note the possibility of reverse causality in the case of savings. Past savings 
decisions are likely to have been influenced by an individual’s α , β  and λ  parameters. At 
the same time, the attitude of individuals to risk or loss today depends partly on their current 
financial status. 
(xx) Ease of short-term savings 
Whether people find it easy or difficult to engage in short-term savings – and remarkably 
38% of the sample find it difficult – has little effect on risk and loss attitudes. 
(xxi) Rainy day fund 
By contrast, whether or not people have a rainy day fund (i.e., precautionary savings) – and 
32% of the sample do not – has a significant effect on risk attitudes. Those with a rainy day 
fund are more risk averse in the gain domain, less risk seeking in the loss domain, and more 
loss averse than those without such a fund.  Again, it is important to note that the causation 
could be reversed.  
(xxii) Region 
A global test indicates that there is no statistical difference in α  and β  parameters across the 
regions. But this masks some interesting regional differences, although it is hard to explain 
why they hold.  For example, respondents living in Wales have both the greatest risk aversion 
in the gain domain and the greatest risk seeking in the loss domain, while the opposite holds 
for those living in the West Midlands. Relative loss aversion, ( ),xΛ is lowest in Wales, 
Scotland and London, and highest in the East Midlands.  
(xxiii) Newspaper 
The newspaper read by respondents – and indeed whether they read a newspaper at all – is a 
powerful indicator of risk and loss attitudes. Guardian and Independent readers have the 
highest level of risk aversion in the gain domain, the lowest level of risk seeking in the loss 
domain and highest level of loss aversion. Their relative loss aversion, ( ),xΛ is considerably 
higher than any other group and this is followed by those who do not take a paper. Readers of 
the Financial Times, the Times, and the Telegraph have the lowest relative loss aversion, as 
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well as being the least risk averse in the gain domain. This is closely followed by Mirror and 
Record readers and then by Express, Mail, Sun and Star readers.   
These results are likely to be linked to other profiling characteristics, such as age, social class 
and political party. For example, the Guardian’s readership comes predominantly from the 
15-34 age group, from social classes ABC1, and with left-leaning and liberal democrat 
political views.8 
(xxiv) Political party 
Liberal Democrats (whom we can conjecture are largely Guardian readers) stand out as 
having the highest level of risk aversion in the gain domain, the lowest level of risk seeking 
in the loss domain and highest level of loss aversion. Their relative loss aversion is 
considerably higher than that of any other political party. By contrast, Scottish National and 
Plaid Cymru Party members appear to be the least risk and loss averse. Lying in between are 
Conservative and Labour Party members, with the latter being more risk averse and having 
marginally higher relative loss aversion than the former. 
(xxv) Religion  
There is a strong correlation of α  with self-reported religion. This is not driven by non-
Christian religions: the total number of Jews, Moslems, Hindus and Sikhs is only 3% of the 
sample. Instead it is due to the fact that non-religious people and Roman Catholics have 
higher values of α  (indicating lower risk aversion) than all other religious affiliations 
(Church of England, other Protestant denominations, other religions). Risk seeking in the loss 
domain ( β ) is virtually identical across all groups. Non-CofE Protestants have the highest 
relative loss aversion, while Catholics and those without a religion the lowest. 
 
 
                                                 
8 https://www.theguardian.com/advertising/guardian-circulation-readership-statistics;      
https://www.statista.com/statistics/380687/the-guardian-the-observer-monthly-reach-by-demographic-uk/; 
https://www.pressgazette.co.uk/mail-uks-most-read-newspaper-brand-under-35s-favour-sun/ 
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(xxvi) Religiosity 
The final profiling characteristic is the level of religiosity. Those who report themselves to be 
religious, are significantly more risk averse than those who report themselves as being non-
religious. There is no difference in risk seeking in the loss domain (consistent with the 
previous section) and religious people have very marginally higher relative loss aversion. 
3.2 Analysing graduate students 
So far our results are not directly comparable with existing studies, such as Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992) or Abdellaoui et al (2008). In order to make a direct comparison, we would 
need to analyse graduate students. To do this, we examine respondents in full-time education 
aged 21-23 of whom there are 71 graduates in our sample. This compares with 25 in the 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) study and 47 in the Abdellaoui et al (2008) study.  
Table 4: Estimated loss aversion parameters for graduate students in three studies 
  N α β λ Λ(1000) 
This study 71 0.703 
(0.034)a 
0.924 
(0.050)a 
1.256 
(0.119) 
7.08 
(2.86, 14.97)b 
Tversky 
and 
Kahnemann 
(1992) 
25 0.88 0.88 2.25 2.25 
Abdellaoui 
et al (2008) 
47 0.86c 
(0.66, 1.08)e 
1.06c,d 
(0.92,1.49)e 
- 2.61 
(1.51, 5.51)e 
Note:  The table presents results for the graduate students in our study together with those from two other 
studies. N = number of respondents,  α  = degree of risk aversion in the domain of gains, β  = degree of risk 
aversion in the domain of losses, λ  = direct loss aversion (i.e., when the loss 1x = − ), and ( )1000Λ  is 
relative loss aversion comparing a loss of 1,000 with a gain of 1,000 (see Equation (4)).  a  Standard errors; b 
90% confidence interval; c Median of estimates of individuals’ parameters: all estimates from Abdellaoui et al 
(2008) are from Table 6; d This is significantly different from unity; e Inter-quartile range of estimates of 
individuals’ parameters. To enable comparison with the other respondents in our study, we report the following 
for our 71 graduate students: ( )5Λ = 1.81 (1.31, 2.39), ( )50Λ  = 3.05 (1.70, 4.84), and ( )500Λ  = 5.24 (2.20, 
9.77). 
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Table 4 presents the NLS estimates of the LA parameters for the sub-sample of our 
respondents who are graduate students, together with the median9 of the individual parameter 
estimates for the other two studies. The table shows the results for a homogeneous group of 
respondents across three studies, although there is no particular reason to expect that groups 
of students in different countries and at different times should have identical LA parameters.   
We make the following observations. Our α estimate is significantly below that of Tversky 
and Kahneman (1992) – indicating greater risk aversion in the gain domain – but our β
estimate is not significantly different. Tversky and Kahneman also find that ( ) 0.88α β= =  
which means that their estimated λ = 2.25 is independent of the gain or loss amount, x . 
However, this does not hold when α β≠  which is likely to be the general case. The 
Abdellaoui et al (2008) estimates of α  and β  are, respectively, 22% and 15% higher than 
ours and this, together with their finding that β is significantly greater than unity, could 
reflect the small sample bias in the NLS estimator they used.10   
Since Abdellaoui et al (2008, pp.253-4) use a normalisation constant of €1,000, we report 
(1,000)Λ for the three studies.11 The relative loss aversion coefficient for our group of 
students (7.08) is much higher than for the other groups, largely because they have such a low 
α estimate. Nevertheless, the difference β α−  at around 0.2 is similar for our study and the 
Abdellaoui et al (2008) study, indicating that the elasticity of relative loss aversion with 
respect to the magnitude of gains and losses will be similar. Overall, it seems fair to conclude 
that the three groups of students have different risk and loss attitudes. 
Table 4 also highlights a major contribution of our study: looking at the behaviour of students 
may be highly misleading when it comes to determining risk and loss aversion for the 
population as a whole. Our students are very different from the wider population in surprising 
ways. Comparing the first rows of Table 3 and 4, we can see that our graduate students are 
                                                 
9 Both Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and Abdellaoui et al (2008) estimate parameters separately for each 
individual respondent and then report the median of the individual estimates.  
10 See Appendix A1.2. 
11 These will correspond to slightly different amounts when expressed in a common currency. 
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less risk averse in the gain domain, less risk seeking in the loss domain, but also much more 
loss averse overall: ( )500Λ  = 5.24 compared with 2.41 for the overall sample. Our 71 
graduate students also differ from the 113 other students in the sample: the former are more 
risk averse in the gain domain, more risk seeking in the loss domain, but overall more loss 
averse. This shows the importance of a study that considers all members of society. 
3.3 Multivariate analysis 
In the previous section, we presented correlations between the LA parameters and various 
profiling characteristics. There are two key weaknesses with this approach. First, the 
correlations are unconditional, i.e., they do not condition on other profiling characteristics 
that could influence risk and loss attitudes. Second, a number of profiling characteristics 
could be highly correlated with each other, e.g., socio-economic variables, such as education, 
social class and income. 
Table 5 reports NLS estimates of a multivariate regression which includes the profiling 
characteristics as explanatory variables. There are two dependent variables: α , risk aversion 
in the gain domain, and β , risk taking in the loss domain. The estimates can be interpreted as 
partial correlations between a dependent variable and a potential explanatory variable, 
conditional on holding all the other potential explanatory variables fixed.  Apart from the 
constant term, what is reported are estimated deviations from a reference individual who is a 
member of the first group in the list of each profiling characteristic –  see Table 3.  
Table 5: Multivariate regressions of α and β  on the profiling characteristics (full sample) 
Characteristic Category dummy α s.e.(α) β s.e.(β) 
  Constant 0.713 (0.068) 0.820 (0.096) 
Gender Female -0.005 (0.012) 0.009 (0.017) 
Age 25-34 -0.042 (0.028) -0.054 (0.038) 
 
35-44 -0.020 (0.029) -0.104 (0.038) 
 
45-54 -0.054 (0.028) -0.091 (0.038) 
 
55-64 -0.083 (0.028) -0.080 (0.038) 
  65 & over -0.074 (0.030) -0.084 (0.042) 
Marital status Single 0.024 (0.016) -0.029 (0.022) 
  
Widowed, separated or 
divorced -0.001 (0.018) -0.018 (0.025) 
No of children One or more children 0.033 (0.016) -0.035 (0.020) 
  No answer re children 0.023 (0.029) -0.073 (0.037) 
Health status Average 0.009 (0.013) -0.031 (0.018) 
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Characteristic Category dummy α s.e.(α) β s.e.(β) 
  Worse than average 0.024 (0.016) -0.025 (0.024) 
Personality 1 Type B (laid back) -0.048 (0.013) 0.011 (0.016) 
Personality 2 Pessimist -0.011 (0.012) 0.026 (0.017) 
Emotional state  Neutral 0.001 (0.021) 0.035 (0.028) 
 
Relaxed 0.040 (0.022) 0.015 (0.029) 
  Not sure 0.034 (0.048) -0.076 (0.052) 
Education 17-19 -0.020 (0.015) 0.015 (0.023) 
 
20 & over 0.016 (0.016) 0.050 (0.022) 
  Other / NA -0.022 (0.023) 0.058 (0.034) 
Financial knowledge Medium 0.015 (0.013) -0.029 (0.020) 
  High 0.046 (0.024) 0.041 (0.032) 
Social class B -0.023 (0.018) 0.069 (0.024) 
 
C1 0.012 (0.018) 0.045 (0.024) 
 
C2 -0.009 (0.021) 0.047 (0.029) 
 
D -0.027 (0.024) 0.042 (0.035) 
 
E -0.044 (0.024) 0.078 (0.037) 
 
No answer -0.006 (0.035) 0.041 (0.049) 
Employment status Part-time* -0.018 (0.018) -0.040 (0.024) 
Management 
responsibility Senior manager 0.019 (0.044) -0.023 (0.049) 
 
Middle manager 0.024 (0.033) -0.074 (0.043) 
 
Junior manager -0.007 (0.032) 0.043 (0.042) 
 
None 0.001 (0.028) 0.020 (0.038) 
  Other / NA 0.010 (0.031) -0.004 (0.041) 
Employment sector Private sector 0.020 (0.024) -0.008 (0.035) 
 
Public corporation 0.013 (0.028) 0.022 (0.039) 
 
Public sector -0.014 (0.027) 0.047 (0.040) 
 
Charity sector -0.012 (0.031) 0.061 (0.048) 
  Other / NA 0.011 (0.027) 0.004 (0.038) 
Job security Insecure 0.001 (0.020) -0.031 (0.025) 
  No answer -0.053 (0.023) -0.013 (0.033) 
Income £15,000-£29,999 0.003 (0.015) -0.023 (0.023) 
 
£30,000-£49,999 0.047 (0.021) -0.026 (0.029) 
 
£50,000 or more 0.075 (0.032) -0.044 (0.037) 
  No answer 0.015 (0.017) -0.016 (0.026) 
Home ownership Mortgage -0.004 (0.020) -0.039 (0.029) 
 
Rent 0.005 (0.022) -0.072 (0.033) 
  No answer / don't know 0.029 (0.025) -0.044 (0.038) 
Savings £1,000 - £9,999 0.024 (0.019) 0.003 (0.025) 
 
£10,000 - £49,999 -0.001 (0.020) -0.006 (0.027) 
 
£50,000 and above 0.052 (0.023) 0.005 (0.032) 
  No answer -0.005 (0.019) 0.013 (0.026) 
Ease of saving Not easy 0.007 (0.013) 0.028 (0.018) 
Rainy day fund No 0.032 (0.015) -0.039 (0.021) 
Region North West -0.013 (0.028) 0.013 (0.039) 
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Characteristic Category dummy α s.e.(α) β s.e.(β) 
 
Yorkshire and the Humber -0.006 (0.030) 0.005 (0.040) 
 
East Midlands -0.004 (0.031) 0.056 (0.044) 
 
West Midlands 0.033 (0.031) 0.054 (0.044) 
 
East of England -0.011 (0.030) 0.048 (0.042) 
 
London 0.011 (0.030) 0.015 (0.040) 
 
South East -0.014 (0.028) 0.030 (0.040) 
 
South West 0.002 (0.031) 0.053 (0.042) 
 
Wales -0.015 (0.034) -0.044 (0.046) 
 
Scotland 0.009 (0.032) -0.005 (0.043) 
  Northern Ireland -0.008 (0.044) 0.011 (0.060) 
Newspaper Sun / Star -0.017 (0.020) 0.022 (0.029) 
 
Mirror / Record 0.026 (0.024) 0.028 (0.033) 
 
Guardian / Independent -0.041 (0.022) 0.073 (0.034) 
 
FT / Times / Telegraph 0.049 (0.025) 0.017 (0.032) 
 
Other paper 0.003 (0.022) 0.043 (0.030) 
  No newspaper -0.017 (0.017) 0.055 (0.025) 
Political party Labour -0.017 (0.015) -0.008 (0.022) 
 
Liberal Democrat -0.054 (0.020) 0.039 (0.031) 
 
SNP or Plaid Cymru 0.039 (0.042) -0.022 (0.053) 
 
Other party -0.030 (0.021) 0.001 (0.032) 
 
No party -0.013 (0.017) -0.040 (0.024) 
  Don't know / NA -0.018 (0.028) 0.009 (0.043) 
Religion Ch of England -0.010 (0.030) 0.010 (0.044) 
 
Roman Catholic 0.002 (0.039) 0.027 (0.057) 
 
Protestant -0.042 (0.036) 0.035 (0.053) 
 
Other -0.037 (0.039) 0.022 (0.055) 
  NA 0.009 (0.025) -0.001 (0.034) 
Religiosity Not religious 0.033 (0.027) 0.040 (0.039) 
  Don't know / NA -0.010 (0.035) 0.047 (0.050) 
Note: The table presents multiple regressions of α  (the degree of risk aversion in the domain of gains) and β  
(the degree of risk aversion in the domain of losses) on category dummies for each characteristic that 
differentiate respondents from a reference individual. The constant term shows the estimated α  or β  for the 
reference individual and the other coefficients show positive or negative deviations from this. The reference 
individual is male, aged 18-24, married/living with partner, no children, better than average health, Type A 
(competitive) personality, optimist, tense at the time of the survey, terminal education age of 16 & under, low 
financial knowledge, social class A, full-time employment, management responsibility of an owner, self-
employed, secure job security, income below £15,000, owns home outright, savings below £1,000, finds short-
term savings easy, has a rainy day fund, Express / Mail reader, Conservative voter, no religion, but religious. 
*Only one employment-status categorical variable is included since the other possibilities (student, retired) are 
collinear with other categorical variables. Standard errors in parentheses, enabling hypothesis tests of whether a 
particular deviation is significantly different from zero to be conducted. 
 
Looking across the two dependent variables, α  and β , together, we observe the following, 
once we condition on all other profiling characteristics. There are five characteristics for 
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which there are now no statistically significant differences between respondents. The first is 
male and female attitudes to risk: this implies that the significant unconditional difference in 
Table 3 is explained by other characteristics, such as income differences. The other four are 
marital status, employment sector, religion and religiosity. In addition, there are five factors 
which are not significant: health status, personality type 2 (optimists vs pessimists), job 
security, ease of short-term savings and region. 
In all other cases, the multivariate analysis generally supports the findings of the bivariate 
analysis, although the relationship is sometimes weaker than before: 
• Age is a statistically significant indicator with people over 65 being more risk averse 
in the gain domain and those between 45 and 64 more risk seeking in the loss domain 
than other age groups. This was apparent in the unconditional correlations in Table 3: 
conditioning reinforces the significance of the age effect. Young people are very loss 
averse. 
• Having children is associated with greater risk taking when facing losses. 
• In terms of personality type 1, Type A (competitive) personalities are less risk averse 
in the gain domain than Type B (laid back) personalities. 
• Individuals who declare their emotional state to be relaxed are less risk averse than 
individuals in other emotional states. 
• Individuals with a terminal educational age above 20 are both less risk averse and less 
willing to take risks when facing losses than those who completed their education at 
an earlier age. 
• Individuals who classify themselves as having a high level of financial knowledge are 
less willing to take risks when facing losses. 
• Members of social class C1 are (weakly) less risk averse than those in other social 
classes, while those in social class E are considerably more. Members of social class 
B are less willing to take risks when facing losses, compared with other social classes.  
• In terms of employment status, part-time workers are more willing to take risks when 
facing losses, compared with full-time workers. 
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• Middle managers are more willing to take risks when facing losses than either other 
types of managers or those without management responsibility. 
• Those on incomes in the range £30,000-£49,999 are less risk averse than those in 
other income groups, while those on incomes in the range £15,000-£49,999 are more 
willing to take risks when facing losses than those in other income groups. 
• Renters are more willing to take risks when facing losses than mortgagors or those 
who own their home outright. 
• Those with savings of £50,000 and above are less risk averse than those with lower 
savings levels.  
• Those with a rainy day fund are more risk averse that those without. 
• In terms of newspaper, the only effects that are now significant are that risk-seeking 
behaviour in the loss domain is lower by readers of the Sun / Star and by those who 
do not read a newspaper. The results are much weaker than in the unconditional case.  
• In terms of political party, Liberal Democrats are less willing to take risks when 
facing losses than members of other political parties. Again, these results are much 
weaker than in the unconditional case.  
We have a large number of potential explanatory categorical variables and so we summarise 
their effect in Table 6 which reports p-values for joint tests of significance, when the 
dependent variables are again α  and β . The null hypothesis of each test is that there is no 
relationship between the dependent variable and the group of potential explanatory variables 
and so a low p-value indicates rejection of the null in favour of the alternative hypothesis that 
there is a relationship.12 For example, the test for age in the α  regression (p = 0.007) is for a 
joint test that all age groups have the same value of α  (after controlling for all other factors 
in the regression): there are six age groups and five dummy variables (one each for ages 25-
                                                 
12 See Appendix A1.3 for an explanation of how the hypothesis tests were constructed. 
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34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64 and 65+) and the test is the joint test that all five dummies have zero 
coefficients, which we reject. 
 
Table 6: Tests of joint hypotheses from multivariate regressions: p-values 
Characteristic α β 
Gender 0.642 0.580 
Age 0.007 0.077 
Marital status 0.308 0.371 
No of children 0.036 0.089 
Health status 0.347 0.246 
Personality 1: Competitive v laid back 0.000 0.482 
Personality 2: Optimist v pessimist 0.333 0.121 
Emotional state 0.002 0.274 
Education 0.071 0.064 
Financial knowledge 0.143 0.012 
Social class 0.063 0.089 
Employment status 0.310 0.096 
Management responsibility 0.800 0.008 
Employment sector 0.317 0.152 
Job security 0.960 0.217 
Income 0.023 0.631 
Home ownership 0.934 0.090 
Savings 0.026 0.979 
Ease of short-term saving  0.602 0.123 
Rainy day fund 0.038 0.063 
Region 0.863 0.413 
Newspaper 0.005 0.169 
Political party 0.057 0.168 
Religion 0.543 0.896 
Religiosity 0.213 0.313 
Note: The figures in the table are the p-values for a joint test that all of the category dummies for a given 
characteristic in Table 5 are equal to zero (i.e., the null hypothesis is that there is no relationship between a 
given characteristic and  α  (the degree of risk aversion in the domain of gains) or β  (degree of risk aversion in 
the domain of losses), after conditioning on the other characteristics. For example, for age, the null hypothesis is 
that the coefficients on the categorical variables for the age dummies 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64 and 65+ are all 
equal to zero. The low p-value of 0.007 indicates that the null hypothesis of no relationship between the 
dependent variable and the group of categorical variables is rejected.  
 
The results are more broad brush than those in Table 5. The only profiling characteristics that 
are significant (at the 10% level) are:  
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• in the gain domain only: personality type 1 (competitive v laid back), emotional state,  
income, savings, rainy day fund, newspaper and political party 
• in the loss domain only: financial knowledge, employment status, management 
responsibility, and home ownership 
• in both domains: age, number of children, education, and social class. 
These results are broadly consistent with Table 5, although the number of profiling 
characteristics that are significant is lower.  
Finally in this section, we draw comparison with two other studies that conducted a 
multivariate analysis. The first is Dohmen et al (2011, Table A1) which finds that women self 
report that they are less likely to take financial risks, after conditioning on other variables. 
The second is von Gaudecker et al (2011) which is the only other study of which we are 
aware that surveys from a national population. Their sample size, at 1,422 individuals, is 
smaller than ours and they assess far fewer characteristics: only gender, age, education, 
income, wealth, and whether the respondent has financial knowledge or is the household’s 
financial administrator. While their baseline estimates of the risk and loss aversion 
parameters (γ = 0.0316 and λ = 2.960) are not directly comparable with ours, their findings 
in terms of characteristics can be compared: women are more risk and loss averse than men 
(even after conditioning on other characteristics such as income), risk aversion increases and 
loss aversion falls with age, risk aversion decreases and loss aversion increases with 
education, risk aversion increases and loss aversion falls with income, risk and loss aversion 
both fall with wealth, and risk and loss aversion are lower for those with financial knowledge 
or who are the household’s financial administrator. These are mostly similar to our findings, 
although there are some differences. For example, we find: a U-shaped relationship between 
loss aversion and age, that risk aversion decreases with income, and a hump-shaped 
relationship between loss aversion and total savings. 
4. Conclusions 
We have estimated a simple parametric version of the Kahneman-Tversky (1992) value 
function for a representative sample of around four thousand respondents from the UK.  The 
estimated value function is S-shaped, exhibiting both direct loss aversion (measured by λ ), 
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risk aversion in the domain of gains (measured by 1α < ), risk seeking behaviour in the 
domain of losses (measured by 1β < ), and with the marginal disutility of losses exceeding 
the marginal utility of gains ( β α> ). In other words, the value function is concave in gains, 
but less concave in losses. 
These findings are consistent with most previous studies, but while these other studies are 
mainly of students, ours is one of the few studies to sample from a national population. We 
also have much more detailed information about the respondents to our survey than all 
previous studies. We had information on 25 profiling characteristics for each respondent 
which enabled us to conduct both bivariate and multivariate analyses to assess if there is a 
statistically significant relationship (both unconditionally and conditionally) between the 
estimated parameters of the respondents’ value function and their profiling characteristics.  
When conditioning on all the characteristics, we find that some characteristics are correlated 
with loss and risk attitudes in the gain domain only (personality type 1 (competitive v laid 
back), emotional state,  income, savings, rainy day fund, newspaper and political party), some 
are correlated in the loss domain only (financial knowledge, employment status, management 
responsibility, and home ownership), while some are correlated in both domains (age, 
number of children, education, and social class).   
We also document that some characteristics that were found to be unconditionally significant 
in the bivariate analysis were not significant when conditioned on other characteristics. One 
example is marital status. We find that widowed, divorced and separated people are more risk 
averse than partnered people who are, in turn, more risk averse than single people. But these 
differences disappear when we condition. Another example is gender. Our study shows that 
women are more loss and risk averse than men, but this is no longer the case when we 
condition, suggesting that gender differences can possibly be explained by other factors, such 
as income differences.  This result is different from the most similar study to ours, namely 
von Gaudecker et al (2011)’s survey of over a thousand Dutch respondents, which finds 
gender differences in loss and risk attitudes remain, even after conditioning.  
One of the challenges facing researchers wishing to estimate loss aversion parameters for the 
general public is to find a simple set of questions that (i) minimise the cognitive burden on 
those answering those questions and (ii) avoid recovering the expectations of the 
experimenters who guided the experimental design. Many previous attempts to do this used 
procedures that turned out to be too complex for many respondents to understand, resulting in 
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the elimination of those producing inconsistent responses, thereby reducing significantly the 
size of the usable sample. A breakthrough came with the study of Abdellaoui et al (2008), 
which used a simple bisection approach involving only certainty equivalents for two-outcome 
prospects. This is the approach adopted in the present study. It resulted in just 16% of the 
sample producing apparently inconsistent responses.  When this group was excluded, it made 
a negligible difference to the estimates of the parameters of the value function.  
Yet even in this simplified framework, the magnitude of loss aversion depends not only on 
the values of the three parameters specifying the value function, but also in general on the 
size of any loss relative to a gain. Only in the rare case when the concavity in the gain and 
loss domains is identical (i.e., when α β= ) will loss aversion be independent of the size of a 
loss. For a representative member of our sample, we estimate relative loss aversion to be 2.41 
for a loss of £500 compared with a gain of the same amount. 
Because many existing studies are based on the responses of students, it is interesting to 
compare our results for the whole sample with a sub-sample of the respondents in our sample 
who are students. We estimate relative loss aversion for these students to be 5.24 for a loss of 
£500 compared with a gain of the same amount. This is more than twice the size of that for 
the whole sample. This follows because although the value functions for the two groups have 
similar concavities in the gain domain, the students’ value function is much less concave in 
the loss domain. This clearly emphasises the problem in generalising from studies of students 
to the population as a whole. 
Another important finding relates to a potential small sample estimation bias. We 
demonstrate that there is a potential upward bias in the estimated parameters of the value 
function if the sample size is low. This is likely to be the case when the value function is 
estimated for individual respondents and they have answered only a small number of 
questions, so the total number of data points is low. In our case, we have only nine data 
points per respondent, and we calculate that this will lead to an upward bias in the estimated 
parameters of up to 17%. To reduce the bias, we needed to pool the responses of respondents 
with similar profiling characteristics until we have a minimum sample size of 200.  
The existing literature has emphasised the relationship between risk and loss attitudes and 
factors such as gender, age, education, income, and savings. Our study of a representative 
sample of the UK population finds that some of these factors (age, education, income, and 
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savings) are also important, but others, in particular gender differences, are not significant, 
once we have controlled for the other factors. We have also found some other characteristics 
not previously studied in the literature that influence risk attitudes, in particular, personality 
type, social class, management responsibility, rainy day fund, newspaper, and political party.  
By including questions on these factors in a client fact find, financial advisers might be able 
to get a better fix on the true loss and risk attitudes of their clients. In particular, they can be 
used to confirm the findings from a more direct elicitation of such attitudes. 
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Appendix 1: Data and estimation issues 
A1.1 Analysis of the data 
The 4,016 responses to each question in the gain and loss domains are shown in Figure A1 
and summary statistics are reported in Table A1. There are spikes at the expected values of 
the prospects and at the extremes. Responses are distributed throughout the range. For all six 
questions, the majority of the responses lie below the mean (which equals the expected value 
of the prospects). 
Figure A1: The distribution of certainty equivalent scores for the three gain and three loss 
risky prospects 
 
- 58 - 
 
Table A1: Summary statistics for the distribution of the certainty equivalent scores for the 
three gain and three risky prospects 
 G1 G2 G3 L4 L5 L6 
Mean 5.52 31.70 221.73 -4.63 -42.63 -415.73 
Percentage of 
responses less 
than the mean 
53 56 61 56 54 53 
Percentage of 
responses 
greater than the 
mean 
47 44 39 44 46 47 
St. dev. 2.65 21.74 220.16 2.67 25.08 268.78 
5th centile 0.54 0.78 7.81 -9.45 -88.28 -882.81 
Lower quartile 3.98 14.84 54.68 -6.17 -57.03 -585.93 
Median 5.07 25.78 132.81 -4.92 -47.65 -492.18 
Upper quartile 7.42 46.09 335.93 -2.89 -24.21 -195.31 
95th centile 9.92 74.21 679.68 -0.07 -0.78 -7.81 
Note: The table shows properties of the distribution of certainty equivalent scores for the three gain and three 
loss risky prospects. 
 
Figure A2 presents the correlations between the 4,016 responses to the different questions. 
The correlations are positive and, in most of the graphs, the observations lie on or near the 45° 
line, which provides some evidence for the internal validity of most of the responses: if there 
were no relationship then this would mean that individual respondents were answering with 
no consistency. 
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Figure A2: The correlations between the responses to the three gain and three loss risky 
prospects 
 
A test for the internal validity of the data is that respondents’ choices are rational: 
1 2 3G G G< <  and 4 5 6L L L< < . However, these conditions are satisfied for 3,359 out of 
4,016 respondents, with 657 respondents (16% of the total) reporting at least one apparently 
irrational choice. As a robustness test we repeat our analysis with these respondents excluded, 
which we call the reduced sample – see Appendix 2. 
A1.2 Estimation 
Our assumption about the iso-elastic functional form of the value function in Equation (3) in 
the main text suggests that we should expect that 1 2 3100 10G G G≈ ≈  (i.e., do not differ by an 
order of magnitude) and so it is useful to define 
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to remove scale effects. Thus, we should expect 10.5ig
α=   and 10.5il β= , regardless of 
which question is being considered. However, it is clear from Figures A1 and A2 that the data 
for g  and l  are very noisy.  
We analyse our data using non-linear least squares in Stata to estimate the α  and β  
parameters separately and then estimate the λ  parameter in a second-stage procedure and in 
this section we explore the econometric reasoning behind this. Harrison and Swarthout (2016) 
note the importance of applying appropriate econometric methods to experimental data and 
suggest that it is often best to use probit models to estimate the effect of explanatory variables 
on choices between different prospects. We will be less ambitious than Harrison and 
Swarthout because we estimate prospects solely with equal probabilities of gain or loss and 
hence we are unable to distinguish the different behavioural models that they consider. 
Our methodology is closest to that of Abdellaoui et al (2008) who use a bisection method. As 
discussed in the main text, this involves asking a series of questions to elicit an estimate of 
the certainty equivalent value (in both the gain or loss domain) compared with a given 
expected amount which differs across the questions. However, unlike Abdellaoui et al (2008), 
we report the results of NLS estimation where we pool responses from sub-groups of the 
survey, clustering the standard errors to allow for within-respondent correlations. We do not 
attempt to estimate individual preference parameters for reasons we shall now discuss. 
We will consider preferences in the gain domain (the reasoning is analogous in the loss 
domain). The NLS estimator minimises  
 ( ){ }21/
1,2,3
0.5  i
i
g α
=
−∑  
resulting in closed-form solutions for the parameter estimates of  
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where the denominator is the logarithm of the arithmetic mean, g , which is calculated over 
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Our concern, however, is with small-sample bias and the variance of the estimator.  
In principle, we could estimate the preference parameter iα  for each individual, since we 
have three data points per individual for each parameter and need a minimum of just one data 
point to derive an estimate.  
Since we have a closed-form solution for the parameter estimates, we know that 
 
( ) ( )
2
2 22
ln 2 ln 2 20;       1 0
ˆ ˆ
ll nn ln
d d
dg dg gg g g g
α α  −
= > = + 
 
  
so αˆ  is a concave function in the relevant range if ( )2 0.13g exp< − ≈  and convex otherwise. 
Furthermore, the function is extremely convex as 1g →  which is the value that we should 
expect if individuals are close to risk neutral (which clearly cannot be ruled out a priori). 
There is likely to be a considerable amount of experimental and sampling error in the 
individual responses, suggesting that, in small samples, the variance of the statistic g  will 
also be large. Consequently, the convexity of the αˆ  function will result in an upward bias in 
our parameter estimates. To get some idea of the numerical importance of this, we conducted 
a Monte Carlo analysis, calculating the distribution of αˆ  and βˆ  for different sample sizes, 
where we draw (with replacement) the ig  and il  values from the full set of 12,048 
observations in our dataset, treating each observation as independent.  
The results are reported in Table A2. The mean parameter estimates change very little in our 
Monte Carlo simulation when the sample size is more than 200. We will assume that a 
sample size of 1,000 is sufficient for the consistency result above to hold. When we draw 
1,000 values of g , the mean value of αˆ  is 0.68. We get a similar figure with only 50 
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observations. However, if we only had three observations, the parameter estimate is 0.80, 
indicating an upward bias of up to 17% in small samples. Combined with the fact that the 
standard deviation of the parameter estimate is also much higher, this upward bias means that 
the parameter estimate is greater than unity 21% of the time. These individuals appear to be 
risk-loving despite the true value of the risk-aversion parameter in gains space being 0.68 
which is considerably less than unity. 
Table A2: Summary statistics for the distribution of αˆ  and βˆ  for different sample sizes 
Sample size 3 12 50 200 1000 
αˆ        
Mean 0.802 0.701 0.685 0.687 0.684 
St Dev 0.747 0.167 0.071 0.036 0.016 
90% 1.296 0.914 0.780 0.732 0.705 
50% 0.672 0.682 0.681 0.684 0.683 
10% 0.411 0.513 0.597 0.644 0.663 
[ ]Pr ˆ 1α >  0.209 0.055 0.000 0.000 0.000 
βˆ       
Mean 0.922 0.852 0.838 0.834 0.833 
St Dev 0.474 0.185 0.088 0.042 0.019 
90% 1.514 1.087 0.949 0.889 0.857 
50% 0.808 0.832 0.831 0.831 0.833 
10% 0.496 0.642 0.729 0.783 0.809 
ˆPr 1β >   0.325 0.188 0.039 0.001 0.000 
 
The estimated values of l  are typically larger than for g , implying β α> . This suggests that 
the bias in βˆ  is potentially larger than for αˆ . However, in our data set, the variance of l  is 
lower. The consequence is that the upward bias of βˆ  at 11% is a little lower than that for αˆ  
in our Monto Carlo simulation. The implication of a larger βˆ   is that the probability of the 
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parameter estimate exceeding unity is now very high (at 33%) and does not really disappear 
until the sample size comfortably exceeds 50 observations. 
Table A3: Summary statistics for g , l  and m  
Variable Mean Type Std. dev. Min Max Observations 
g  0.364 overall 0.273 0.007 0.992 N = 12048 
  between 0.184 0.008 0.992 n =  4016 
  within 0.202 -0.293 1.020 T =  3 
l  -0.435 overall 0.263 -0.992 -0.007 N = 12048 
  between 0.209 -0.992 -0.008 n =  4016 
  within 0.160 -1.092 0.222 T =  3 
m  -0.400 overall 0.447 -1.969 0 N = 12048 
  between 0.325 -1.968 -0.000 n =  4016 
  within 0.307 -1.707 0.904 T =  3 
Note: g , l  and m are defined in (A1). The “overall” standard deviation refers to the standard deviation of the 
responses across all 3 questions for all 4,016 respondents. The “between” standard deviation refers to the 
standard deviation of the responses across the 4,016 respondents (i.e., the responses to the 3 questions are 
aggregated).  The “within” standard deviation refers to the standard deviation of the responses across the 3 
questions (i.e., the responses of the 4,016 respondents are aggregated). Since the overall variance is the sum of 
the between and within variances, the overall standard deviation is less than the sum of the two standard 
deviations. 
Our Monte Carlo results are based on the values of g  being independent, but this would be 
insufficiently conservative. Table A3 reports summary statistics for g , l  and m . This 
confirms what we observed in Figure A2, namely that there is a positive correlation between 
the reported values for g  and l  for each respondent, but this correlation is imperfect since 
the within standard deviations are non-zero. To interpret the estimates of α  and β  in the light 
of the Monte Carlo simulations, we need to account for the fact that, although we have three 
responses for each individual, they are not independent and hence the true bias is likely to be 
larger than suggested by the Monte Carlo simulations. For this reason, we argue that we need 
a minimum of 200 observations in any NLS estimation to remove any biases. The table also 
shows evidence of a positive correlation in the reported values across respondents (since the 
between standard deviations are non-zero). 
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There are two consequences of these results. First, we cannot reliably estimate the α  and β  
parameters based on individual response data. We need to aggregate data across (potentially 
similar) respondents until we have at least 200 observations in order to minimise the bias due 
to sampling error. Second, it suggests that the variance of responses in questionnaires is 
sufficiently large that there is a high chance of finding apparent risk-loving behaviour in the 
domain of gains ( 1)α >  for any given individual. In the light of this, the findings of 
Abdellaoui et al. (2008, Table 4), which shows significant proportions of individuals having 
convex preferences, are quite possibly due to a mixture of bias and sampling error: the 
estimated curvature of the value function in the gain or loss domain appears to be based on 
only six observations (since they do not report the details of their NLS estimation, it is 
difficult to say much more about this). 
Finally, we estimate λ  using a two-stage process. Recall that in the last three questions of the 
survey, the choice facing respondents is between a prospect of a 50% chance of a gain of 
( 1,2,3)iG i =  and a 50% chance of a loss of ( 7,8,9)jM j = , on the one hand, and a 
prospect of zero with certainty, on the other. To be indifferent between the choices it must be 
the case that (using re-scaled responses (A1)) 
1
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and this motivates our two-stage estimator, which chooses the value of λ  to minimise 
(conditional of the estimated αˆ  and βˆ ) 
{ }2
1,
ˆ ˆˆ 1
6
2,3
 
i
i im g
α β βλ
=
−
+ −∑  
We calculate the standard errors by boot-strapping to allow for the fact that the estimation of 
λ  is based upon αˆ  and βˆ  rather than α  and β .  
We will illustrate the procedure using the age variable. We divided the respondents into six 
age brackets and estimated six separate estimates of α : [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]18 24 25 34 35 44 45 54 55 64ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, , , ,α α α α α− − − − −
and [ ]65αˆ + . The estimate of [ ]18 24αˆ −  across 350 respondents is found by minimising  
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Stata also produces the standard error of [ ]18 24αˆ − . The six β  parameters and their standard 
errors are estimated in a similar way.  
Conditional on [ ]18 24αˆ − and [ ]18 24βˆ − , the estimate of [ ]18 24λ −  is found by minimising 
[ ] [ ] [ ]( )
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To estimate the standard error of [ ]18 24λ − , we use the following procedure. In each bootstrap 
replication, we re-sample 350 times with replacement from the 350 respondents aged 18-24. 
We take complete sets of the nine answers to questions 1-9 to allow for any correlation of 
answers between questions from each respondent and then re-estimate [ ]18 24α − , [ ]18 24β −  and 
[ ]18 24λ − . From this we obtain the distribution of the estimated λ  parameters and hence the 
standard errors.  
All the parameter estimates and their standard errors are shown in Table 3. 
A1.3 Hypothesis testing 
In this section, we explain how the hypothesis tests in Table 6 in the main text are constructed. 
These involve a chi-squared test for the equality of the parameters.  
Again, we will illustrate this using the age variable. We need to estimate jointly the six 
parameters [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]18 24 25 34 35 44 45 54 55 64ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, , , ,α α α α α− − − − − and [ ]65αˆ + and test whether they are equal. 
This is easiest to do by choosing a transformed set of parameters [ ]18 24α − and [ ]25 34−∆ ,…, [ ]65+∆  
to minimise 
 ( )
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]25 34 35 44 45 54 55 64 6518 24 25 34 35 44 45 54 55 64 65
2
1/
1,2,3
0.5 i i i i id d d d di
i
g α
− − − − +− − − − − + +∆ +∆ +∆ +∆ +∆ 
 
=
 
− 
 
∑  
where 
[ ]25 34
id
−
 is a dummy variable taking the value unity for individuals aged 25-34 and zero 
otherwise and [ ] [ ] [ ]25 34 25 34 18 24α α− − −∆ ≡ −  etc. 
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We can then test the null hypothesis 
 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]25 34 35 44 45 54 55 64 650 : 0H
− − − − +∆ = ∆ = ∆ = ∆ = ∆ =  
which is equivalent to the desired null hypothesis  
 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]18 24 25 34 35 44 45 54 55 64 650 :H α α α α α α
− − − − − += = = = =  
Exactly analogous procedures are used to estimate and test the equality between the six β  
parameters. 
We do not conduct hypotheses tests involving the λ  parameters for a number of reasons. 
First, since we know that the αˆ  and βˆ  estimates are significantly different, it is a moot point 
whether testing for equality of the λ  parameters is a conceptually interesting exercise. 
Second and more importantly, the boot-strapping procedure does not allow us to perform a 
test for equality of the λ  parameters alone. 
To see why, we note that the null hypothesis of a test for equality of the λ  parameters would 
be (in the case of the age variables) 
 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]18 24 25 34 35 44 45 54 55 64 650 :H λ λ λ λ λ λ
− − − − − += = = = =  
and we wish to test this rather than the more restrictive null hypothesis that 
 
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
18 24 25 34 35 44 45 54 55 64 65
0
18 24 25 34 35 44 45 54 55 64 65
18 24 25 34 35 44 45 54 55 64 65
:H
and
and
α α α α α α
β β β β β β
λ λ λ λ λ λ
− − − − − +
− − − − − +
− − − − − +
= = = = =
= = = = =
= = = = =
 
However, our boot-strapping procedure only allows us to test the more restrictive null 
hypothesis. Under the restricted null hypothesis, the value of λ  would be the same for the 18-
24 age group as for all of the other age groups. So the bootstrapping procedure generates the 
distribution relevant for the equality test by randomly drawing from all age groups when 
generating the simulated 18-24 age group’s observations. Further, because we must allow for 
correlation between individual responses to the nine questions, we sample at an individual 
rather than at a question level. By sampling in this way, we would allocate individuals to the 
18-24 age group with the average values of α  and β across all age groups and hence be 
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imposing the null hypothesis that the α  and β  parameters were equal. Thus the test of the 
marginal hypothesis that the λ  parameters are equal would be conditional on the already-
rejected hypothesis that the α  and β  parameters were equal, so cannot be tested 
independently.  
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Appendix 2: Reduced sample results  
As noted in the main text, 657 respondents (16% of the total) reported at least one apparently 
irrational choice, i.e., their responses did not completely satisfy the satiation requirement that 
1 2 3G G G< <  and 4 5 6L L L< < . In Table A4, we report a complete set of results for the 
reduced sample of 3,359 whose responses fully satisfy satiation. 
Table A5 compares and contrasts the full sample and reduced sample results. The first two 
columns show the difference between the estimates for the full sample and the sub-sample, 
together with the p-value for the equality test. In nearly all cases, we can reject the null 
hypothesis that the parameter estimates are the same in the full and sub-samples. However, 
this is mainly because the large sample size leads to small standard errors, so the parameters 
are estimated with a high degree of precision. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the difference is 
typically very small: the average difference between the corresponding estimates in Table 3 
and Table A4 is 0.02 for α  and -0.05 for β . Hence the reduced sample is marginally less 
risk averse in gains and more risk seeking in losses. 
The final two columns present relative loss aversion (50)Λ for the full and reduced samples 
(taken from Table 3 and Table A.4, respectively). The reduced sample typically displays 
higher loss aversion, although not much higher and the confidence intervals overlap. 
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Table A4: Estimated loss aversion parameters for different subgroups of survey respondents (reduced sample) 
 Characteristic N α β λ Λ(5) Λ(50) Λ(500) 
All 3359 0.704 
(0.006) 
0.868 
(0.008) 
0.996 
(0.013) 
1.30 
(1.23, 1.35) 
1.89 
(1.73, 2.05) 
2.76 
(2.42, 3.10) 
Gender               
Male 1547 0.718 
(0.009) 
0.856 
(0.012) 
0.987 
(0.019) 
1.23 
(1.14, 1.31) 
1.70 
(1.48, 1.91) 
2.34 
(1.89, 2.76) 
Female 1812 0.692 
(0.008) 
0.877 
(0.012) 
1.003 
(0.019) 
1.35 
(1.26, 1.44) 
2.07 
(1.82, 2.32) 
3.17 
(2.62, 3.76) 
equality test  p = 0.031 p = 0.215     
Age               
18-24 327 0.748 
(0.018) 
0.908 
(0.023) 
1.187 
(0.055) 
1.55 
(1.33, 1.79) 
2.26 
(1.72, 2.92) 
3.33 
(2.18, 4.78) 
25-34 374 0.735 
(0.017) 
0.896 
(0.025) 
1.147 
(0.051) 
1.50 
(1.31, 1.73) 
2.20 
(1.71, 2.83) 
3.24 
(2.20, 4.58) 
35-44 523 0.770 
(0.017) 
0.825 
(0.019) 
0.954 
(0.029) 
1.05 
(0.94, 1.16) 
1.20 
(0.97, 1.43) 
1.37 
(0.99, 1.77) 
45-54 684 0.719 
(0.013) 
0.845 
(0.018) 
0.923 
(0.025) 
1.13 
(1.01, 1.25) 
1.52 
(1.23, 1.83) 
2.04 
(1.50, 2.70) 
55-64 787 0.662 
(0.012) 
0.879 
(0.019) 
0.982 
(0.028) 
1.39 
(1.25, 1.54) 
2.30 
(1.86, 2.82) 
3.81 
(2.74, 5.18) 
65 & over 664 0.652 
(0.013) 
0.878 
(0.021) 
0.981 
(0.027) 
1.41 
(1.26, 1.57) 
2.37 
(1.94, 2.91) 
4.01 
(2.95, 5.35) 
equality test  p = 0.000 p = 0.045     
Age and gender               
M 18-24 145 0.738 
(0.028) 
0.883 
(0.035) 
1.164 
(0.072) 
1.50 
(1.22, 1.80) 
2.16 
(1.43, 2.93) 
3.14 
(1.66, 4.89) 
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 Characteristic N α β λ Λ(5) Λ(50) Λ(500) 
M 25-34 119 0.780 
(0.030) 
0.926 
(0.044) 
1.112 
(0.102) 
1.45 
(1.05, 1.84) 
2.09 
(1.18, 3.22) 
3.09 
(1.30, 5.59) 
M 35-44 230 0.784 
(0.025) 
0.842 
(0.030) 
0.950 
(0.046) 
1.06 
(0.89, 1.25) 
1.24 
(0.87, 1.67) 
1.47 
(0.84, 2.29) 
M 45-54 338 0.745 
(0.020) 
0.842 
(0.024) 
0.945 
(0.041) 
1.11 
(0.95, 1.31) 
1.40 
(1.01, 1.90) 
1.78 
(1.10, 2.76) 
M 55-64 344 0.656 
(0.018) 
0.857 
(0.026) 
1.007 
(0.046) 
1.39 
(1.20, 1.67) 
2.23 
(1.68, 3.09) 
3.62 
(2.35, 5.80) 
M 65 & over 371 0.687 
(0.018) 
0.846 
(0.027) 
0.941 
(0.037) 
1.22 
(1.02, 1.40) 
1.77 
(1.28, 2.30) 
2.59 
(1.59, 3.76) 
F 18-24 182 0.756 
(0.023) 
0.929 
(0.032) 
1.207 
(0.081) 
1.61 
(1.33, 2.00) 
2.44 
(1.73, 3.41) 
3.71 
(2.21, 5.92) 
F 25-34 255 0.715 
(0.021) 
0.882 
(0.030) 
1.164 
(0.058) 
1.52 
(1.30, 1.83) 
2.25 
(1.64, 3.09) 
3.36 
(2.08, 5.26) 
F 35-44 293 0.759 
(0.022) 
0.811 
(0.025) 
0.958 
(0.036) 
1.05 
(0.91, 1.21) 
1.19 
(0.90, 1.53) 
1.36 
(0.89, 2.00) 
F 45-54 346 0.694 
(0.018) 
0.848 
(0.026) 
0.902 
(0.030) 
1.17 
(1.02, 1.35) 
1.71 
(1.30, 2.22) 
2.51 
(1.64, 3.65) 
F 55-64 443 0.667 
(0.016) 
0.896 
(0.027) 
0.963 
(0.031) 
1.39 
(1.22, 1.57) 
2.37 
(1.84, 2.93) 
4.05 
(2.76, 5.52) 
F 65 & over 293 0.611 
(0.018) 
0.921 
(0.033) 
1.037 
(0.053) 
1.71 
(1.44, 2.02) 
3.51 
(2.52, 4.75) 
7.26 
(4.42, 11.06) 
Marital status               
Married or living with partner 2122 0.699 
(0.007) 
0.868 
(0.011) 
0.983 
(0.015) 
1.29 
(1.21, 1.37) 
1.90 
(1.69, 2.15) 
2.81 
(2.35, 3.36) 
Single 866 0.743 
(0.012) 
0.866 
(0.016) 
1.028 
(0.028) 
1.25 
(1.12, 1.38) 
1.66 
(1.34, 1.98) 
2.20 
(1.61, 2.86) 
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 Characteristic N α β λ Λ(5) Λ(50) Λ(500) 
Widowed, separated or 
divorced 
371 0.642 
(0.018) 
0.872 
(0.028) 
0.994 
(0.041) 
1.44 
(1.24, 1.70) 
2.48 
(1.82, 3.31) 
4.28 
(2.72, 6.46) 
equality test  p = 0.000 p = 0.981     
Number of children               
No children 2328 0.687 
(0.007) 
0.880 
(0.010) 
1.021 
(0.016) 
1.39 
(1.31, 1.47) 
2.18 
(1.95, 2.41) 
3.40 
(2.89, 3.95) 
One or more children 771 0.741 
(0.013) 
0.844 
(0.017) 
0.959 
(0.026) 
1.14 
(1.02, 1.27) 
1.46 
(1.16, 1.78) 
1.88 
(1.34, 2.49) 
No answer 260 0.751 
(0.024) 
0.828 
(0.027) 
0.923 
(0.041) 
1.06 
(0.90, 1.25) 
1.29 
(0.93, 1.78) 
1.58 
(0.96, 2.53) 
equality test (excl NA)  p = 0.000 p = 0.064     
Health status               
Better than average 889 0.703 
(0.012) 
0.896 
(0.017) 
1.021 
(0.030) 
1.40 
(1.28, 1.55) 
2.19 
(1.84, 2.64) 
3.44 
(2.66, 4.50) 
Average 1754 0.704 
(0.008) 
0.856 
(0.011) 
1.001 
(0.018) 
1.28 
(1.20, 1.37) 
1.82 
(1.62, 2.05) 
2.59 
(2.17, 3.09) 
Worse than average 716 0.703 
(0.013) 
0.862 
(0.019) 
0.957 
(0.027) 
1.24 
(1.09, 1.40) 
1.79 
(1.42, 2.24) 
2.59 
(1.84, 3.60) 
equality test  p = 0.992 p = 0.132     
Personality type 1               
Type A (competitive) 1017 0.752 
(0.012) 
0.862 
(0.014) 
0.963 
(0.022) 
1.15 
(1.05, 1.24) 
1.48 
(1.24, 1.72) 
1.91 
(1.48, 2.38) 
Type B (laid back) 2342 0.684 
(0.007) 
0.870 
(0.010) 
1.012 
(0.016) 
1.37 
(1.29, 1.45) 
2.10 
(1.87, 2.35) 
3.24 
(2.73, 3.81) 
equality test  p = 0.000 p = 0.666     
Personality type 2               
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 Characteristic N α β λ Λ(5) Λ(50) Λ(500) 
Optimist 2202 0.704 
(0.007) 
0.860 
(0.010) 
0.972 
(0.015) 
1.25 
(1.18, 1.33) 
1.79 
(1.60, 2.00) 
2.57 
(2.16, 3.02) 
Pessimist 1157 0.704 
(0.010) 
0.882 
(0.014) 
1.046 
(0.027) 
1.40 
(1.27, 1.52) 
2.12 
(1.76, 2.46) 
3.22 
(2.45, 4.01) 
equality test  p = 0.999 p = 0.216     
Emotional state               
Tense 286 0.682 
(0.020) 
0.864 
(0.029) 
1.025 
(0.051) 
1.38 
(1.18, 1.62) 
2.12 
(1.59, 2.82) 
3.27 
(2.12, 4.94) 
Neutral 1503 0.693 
(0.008) 
0.883 
(0.013) 
1.055 
(0.021) 
1.44 
(1.34, 1.54) 
2.23 
(1.96, 2.54) 
3.48 
(2.87, 4.20) 
Relaxed 1502 0.718 
(0.009) 
0.858 
(0.013) 
0.951 
(0.018) 
1.19 
(1.11, 1.27) 
1.65 
(1.41, 1.85) 
2.30 
(1.80, 2.71) 
Not sure 68 0.723 
(0.050) 
0.769 
(0.050) 
0.823 
(0.076) 
0.92 
(0.63, 1.35) 
1.09 
(0.49, 2.05) 
1.34 
(0.38, 3.17) 
equality test (excl NS)  p = 0.067 p = 0.391     
Education               
16 & under 868 0.669 
(0.011) 
0.855 
(0.018) 
0.910 
(0.020) 
1.22 
(1.11, 1.35) 
1.87 
(1.55, 2.27) 
2.88 
(2.17, 3.81) 
17-19 737 0.682 
(0.013) 
0.861 
(0.019) 
0.974 
(0.026) 
1.30 
(1.19, 1.45) 
1.98 
(1.63, 2.39) 
3.00 
(2.22, 3.93) 
20 & over 1148 0.735 
(0.010) 
0.870 
(0.013) 
1.064 
(0.024) 
1.33 
(1.23, 1.42) 
1.82 
(1.56, 2.06) 
2.49 
(1.99, 2.98) 
Other 606 0.724 
(0.014) 
0.890 
(0.019) 
1.035 
(0.033) 
1.36 
(1.22, 1.52) 
2.01 
(1.62, 2.45) 
2.97 
(2.15, 3.96) 
equality test (excl Other)  p = 0.000 p = 0.772     
Financial knowledge               
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 Characteristic N α β λ Λ(5) Λ(50) Λ(500) 
Low 801 0.685 
(0.012) 
0.892 
(0.018) 
1.022 
(0.029) 
1.43 
(1.29, 1.58) 
2.31 
(1.88, 2.76) 
3.75 
(2.73, 4.84) 
Medium 2201 0.701 
(0.007) 
0.855 
(0.010) 
0.985 
(0.015) 
1.26 
(1.19, 1.33) 
1.80 
(1.62, 1.98) 
2.56 
(2.19, 2.97) 
High 357 0.763 
(0.021) 
0.891 
(0.024) 
1.004 
(0.044) 
1.26 
(1.09, 1.49) 
1.73 
(1.32, 2.33) 
2.39 
(1.56, 3.63) 
equality test  p = 0.004 p = 0.126     
Social class               
A 558 0.733 
(0.015) 
0.819 
(0.019) 
0.954 
(0.028) 
1.09 
(0.97, 1.23) 
1.33 
(1.05, 1.67) 
1.63 
(1.13, 2.27) 
B 753 0.704 
(0.012) 
0.889 
(0.017) 
1.039 
(0.030) 
1.41 
(1.27, 1.54) 
2.17 
(1.77, 2.63) 
3.36 
(2.49, 4.44) 
C1 898 0.719 
(0.011) 
0.881 
(0.016) 
1.049 
(0.027) 
1.37 
(1.25, 1.48) 
2.00 
(1.70, 2.30) 
2.92 
(2.32, 3.58) 
C2 470 0.704 
(0.017) 
0.850 
(0.023) 
0.947 
(0.029) 
1.21 
(1.07, 1.37) 
1.70 
(1.34, 2.15) 
2.42 
(1.67, 3.38) 
D 281 0.671 
(0.020) 
0.865 
(0.032) 
0.976 
(0.045) 
1.36 
(1.14, 1.63) 
2.18 
(1.54, 3.01) 
3.51 
(2.09, 5.64) 
E 294 0.631 
(0.019) 
0.901 
(0.035) 
0.929 
(0.046) 
1.46 
(1.21, 1.72) 
2.77 
(1.93, 3.81) 
5.33 
(3.07, 8.36) 
Not available 105 0.722 
(0.038) 
0.866 
(0.051) 
0.980 
(0.069) 
1.27 
(0.97, 1.65) 
1.84 
(1.04, 2.95) 
2.73 
(1.11, 5.26) 
equality test (excl NA)  p = 0.000 p = 0.065     
Employment status               
Full-time 1407 0.743 
(0.009) 
0.856 
(0.012) 
0.998 
(0.020) 
1.20 
(1.12, 1.30) 
1.56 
(1.39, 1.79) 
2.03 
(1.70, 2.50) 
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 Characteristic N α β λ Λ(5) Λ(50) Λ(500) 
Part-time 506 0.704 
(0.015) 
0.854 
(0.021) 
0.979 
(0.032) 
1.26 
(1.12, 1.39) 
1.79 
(1.42, 2.16) 
2.56 
(1.80, 3.33) 
Student 168 0.742 
(0.026) 
0.957 
(0.036) 
1.271 
(0.087) 
1.81 
(1.46, 2.28) 
3.03 
(2.05, 4.59) 
5.12 
(2.87, 9.06) 
Retired 935 0.660 
(0.011) 
0.865 
(0.017) 
0.959 
(0.024) 
1.34 
(1.22, 1.48) 
2.16 
(1.81, 2.59) 
3.50 
(2.68, 4.57) 
Not working 264 0.646 
(0.018) 
0.893 
(0.031) 
1.004 
(0.044) 
1.52 
(1.27, 1.80) 
2.73 
(1.92, 3.69) 
4.94 
(2.89, 7.73) 
No answer 79 0.674 
(0.036) 
0.931 
(0.064) 
1.033 
(0.089) 
1.56 
(1.12, 2.24) 
2.92 
(1.55, 5.24) 
5.62 
(2.09, 12.29) 
equality test (only FT, PT, 
NW) 
 p = 0.000 p = 0.525     
Management responsibility               
Owner, etc 256 0.700 
(0.022) 
0.838 
(0.029) 
1.023 
(0.050) 
1.31 
(1.11, 1.55) 
1.84 
(1.34, 2.42) 
2.61 
(1.61, 3.87) 
Senior manager 125 0.748 
(0.037) 
0.822 
(0.037) 
0.927 
(0.056) 
1.06 
(0.85, 1.32) 
1.29 
(0.80, 1.93) 
1.59 
(0.76, 2.86) 
Middle manager 263 0.778 
(0.021) 
0.768 
(0.024) 
0.883 
(0.032) 
0.88 
(0.77, 1.01) 
0.88 
(0.68, 1.13) 
0.88 
(0.60, 1.27) 
Junior manager 373 0.731 
(0.018) 
0.903 
(0.024) 
1.049 
(0.039) 
1.40 
(1.20, 1.58) 
2.10 
(1.58, 2.64) 
3.17 
(2.07, 4.42) 
No management 
responsibility 
908 0.717 
(0.011) 
0.879 
(0.016) 
1.024 
(0.026) 
1.34 
(1.22, 1.46) 
1.95 
(1.65, 2.31) 
2.86 
(2.23, 3.67) 
Other / NA 1434 0.673 
(0.009) 
0.881 
(0.014) 
0.993 
(0.020) 
1.39 
(1.30, 1.50) 
2.26 
(1.99, 2.58) 
3.67 
(3.03, 4.44) 
equality test (excl Oth/NA)  p = 0.075 p = 0.001     
Employment sector               
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 Characteristic N α β λ Λ(5) Λ(50) Λ(500) 
Self-employed 315 0.684 
(0.019) 
0.857 
(0.027) 
1.055 
(0.043) 
1.40 
(1.21, 1.67) 
2.12 
(1.56, 2.87) 
3.22 
(2.03, 5.01) 
Private sector 1025 0.722 
(0.011) 
0.858 
(0.015) 
0.993 
(0.024) 
1.25 
(1.15, 1.35) 
1.72 
(1.47, 2.01) 
2.38 
(1.87, 3.01) 
Public corporation 459 0.716 
(0.016) 
0.847 
(0.022) 
0.950 
(0.032) 
1.17 
(1.03, 1.32) 
1.58 
(1.25, 2.03) 
2.15 
(1.50, 3.07) 
Public sector 387 0.691 
(0.017) 
0.891 
(0.025) 
1.010 
(0.040) 
1.39 
(1.21, 1.59) 
2.20 
(1.65, 2.85) 
3.52 
(2.28, 5.12) 
Charity sector 173 0.704 
(0.025) 
0.913 
(0.036) 
1.050 
(0.061) 
1.48 
(1.19, 1.84) 
2.43 
(1.62, 3.45) 
4.05 
(2.19, 6.61) 
Other / NA 1000 0.691 
(0.011) 
0.874 
(0.016) 
0.992 
(0.023) 
1.34 
(1.22, 1.45) 
2.05 
(1.72, 2.38) 
3.14 
(2.42, 3.90) 
equality test (excl Oth/NA)  p = 0.356 p = 0.447     
Job security               
Secure 1506 0.737 
(0.009) 
0.864 
(0.012) 
1.003 
(0.018) 
1.23 
(1.16, 1.31) 
1.66 
(1.45, 1.87) 
2.24 
(1.82, 2.64) 
Insecure 407 0.717 
(0.018) 
0.824 
(0.023) 
0.958 
(0.035) 
1.15 
(1.01, 1.31) 
1.48 
(1.16, 1.88) 
1.92 
(1.32, 2.68) 
No answer 1446 0.667 
(0.009) 
0.884 
(0.014) 
1.000 
(0.018) 
1.42 
(1.33, 1.52) 
2.35 
(2.07, 2.66) 
3.88 
(3.21, 4.65) 
equality test  p = 0.323 p = 0.120     
Income               
Below £15,000 859 0.674 
(0.011) 
0.887 
(0.018) 
1.019 
(0.031) 
1.45 
(1.31, 1.61) 
2.39 
(1.97, 2.93) 
3.96 
(2.94, 5.32) 
£15,000-£29,999 897 0.691 
(0.011) 
0.863 
(0.016) 
1.003 
(0.028) 
1.33 
(1.22, 1.48) 
2.00 
(1.68, 2.39) 
3.01 
(2.31, 3.89) 
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 Characteristic N α β λ Λ(5) Λ(50) Λ(500) 
£30,000-£49,999 487 0.739 
(0.015) 
0.863 
(0.021) 
1.011 
(0.031) 
1.24 
(1.10, 1.37) 
1.67 
(1.34, 2.03) 
2.25 
(1.62, 2.97) 
£50,000 & above 188 0.813 
(0.028) 
0.821 
(0.030) 
0.907 
(0.039) 
0.92 
(0.75, 1.10) 
0.95 
(0.63, 1.32) 
0.99 
(0.53, 1.58) 
No answer 928 0.705 
(0.011) 
0.867 
(0.016) 
0.982 
(0.022) 
1.27 
(1.17, 1.38) 
1.84 
(1.57, 2.16) 
2.67 
(2.10, 3.40) 
equality test (excl NA)  p = 0.000 p = 0.278     
Home ownership               
Own outright 595 0.670 
(0.014) 
0.894 
(0.023) 
0.993 
(0.038) 
1.44 
(1.26, 1.65) 
2.45 
(1.89, 3.10) 
4.20 
(2.86, 5.81) 
Mortgage 515 0.720 
(0.015) 
0.856 
(0.020) 
1.005 
(0.032) 
1.25 
(1.13, 1.39) 
1.70 
(1.41, 2.04) 
2.34 
(1.76, 3.06) 
Rent 326 0.688 
(0.020) 
0.853 
(0.029) 
0.963 
(0.045) 
1.26 
(1.06, 1.50) 
1.85 
(1.34, 2.53) 
2.75 
(1.65, 4.27) 
No answer / don't know 1923 0.712 
(0.008) 
0.866 
(0.011) 
1.001 
(0.016) 
1.28 
(1.21, 1.36) 
1.82 
(1.63, 2.02) 
2.60 
(2.20, 3.04) 
equality test (excl NA/DK)  p = 0.055 p = 0.378     
Savings               
Below £1,000 744 0.717 
(0.013) 
0.855 
(0.018) 
0.971 
(0.024) 
1.22 
(1.11, 1.33) 
1.69 
(1.42, 1.98) 
2.36 
(1.82, 2.94) 
£1,000 - £9,999 700 0.717 
(0.013) 
0.866 
(0.018) 
1.013 
(0.028) 
1.30 
(1.18, 1.44) 
1.86 
(1.54, 2.21) 
2.66 
(2.01, 3.42) 
£10,000 - £49,999 589 0.688 
(0.013) 
0.860 
(0.019) 
1.052 
(0.031) 
1.39 
(1.25, 1.53) 
2.06 
(1.68, 2.46) 
3.08 
(2.26, 3.97) 
£50,000 and above 530 0.719 
(0.015) 
0.872 
(0.021) 
0.966 
(0.035) 
1.24 
(1.08, 1.41) 
1.77 
(1.34, 2.24) 
2.56 
(1.68, 3.58) 
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 Characteristic N α β λ Λ(5) Λ(50) Λ(500) 
No answer 796 0.682 
(0.012) 
0.885 
(0.019) 
0.988 
(0.030) 
1.37 
(1.24, 1.55) 
2.20 
(1.82, 2.72) 
3.54 
(2.64, 4.74) 
equality test (excl NA)  p = 0.300 p = 0.934     
Ease of short-term saving               
Easy 2111 0.705 
(0.007) 
0.867 
(0.011) 
0.995 
(0.015) 
1.30 
(1.22, 1.37) 
1.91 
(1.70, 2.11) 
2.79 
(2.35, 3.24) 
Not easy 1248 0.702 
(0.010) 
0.869 
(0.014) 
0.997 
(0.023) 
1.31 
(1.21, 1.42) 
1.93 
(1.67, 2.23) 
2.86 
(2.30, 3.48) 
equality test  p = 0.850 p = 0.910     
Rainy day fund               
Yes 2294 0.696 
(0.007) 
0.873 
(0.010) 
1.012 
(0.016) 
1.34 
(1.26, 1.43) 
2.01 
(1.79, 2.27) 
3.03 
(2.54, 3.61) 
No 1065 0.720 
(0.011) 
0.856 
(0.015) 
0.966 
(0.021) 
1.20 
(1.10, 1.29) 
1.64 
(1.39, 1.88) 
2.24 
(1.76, 2.75) 
equality test  p = 0.073 p = 0.331     
Region               
North East 142 0.696 
(0.028) 
0.848 
(0.037) 
0.977 
(0.059) 
1.25 
(0.98, 1.54) 
1.81 
(1.13, 2.55) 
2.64 
(1.28, 4.28) 
North West 398 0.681 
(0.015) 
0.865 
(0.024) 
1.037 
(0.040) 
1.39 
(1.24, 1.60) 
2.14 
(1.70, 2.69) 
3.29 
(2.34, 4.62) 
Yorkshire and the Humber 317 0.689 
(0.018) 
0.863 
(0.027) 
0.993 
(0.042) 
1.33 
(1.13, 1.53) 
2.01 
(1.47, 2.58) 
3.05 
(1.90, 4.41) 
East Midlands 252 0.692 
(0.020) 
0.881 
(0.031) 
1.078 
(0.052) 
1.48 
(1.25, 1.74) 
2.34 
(1.72, 3.16) 
3.71 
(2.32, 5.69) 
West Midlands 248 0.767 
(0.024) 
0.907 
(0.032) 
0.979 
(0.053) 
1.24 
(1.00, 1.52) 
1.76 
(1.13, 2.52) 
2.51 
(1.29, 4.19) 
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 Characteristic N α β λ Λ(5) Λ(50) Λ(500) 
East of England 290 0.695 
(0.020) 
0.892 
(0.029) 
1.016 
(0.052) 
1.41 
(1.18, 1.71) 
2.27 
(1.56, 3.19) 
3.68 
(2.11, 5.98) 
London 422 0.732 
(0.019) 
0.852 
(0.023) 
0.941 
(0.032) 
1.14 
(1.00, 1.30) 
1.51 
(1.15, 1.95) 
2.02 
(1.33, 2.94) 
South East 421 0.691 
(0.016) 
0.869 
(0.025) 
1.027 
(0.035) 
1.39 
(1.21, 1.56) 
2.12 
(1.64, 2.70) 
3.27 
(2.21, 4.62) 
South West 293 0.690 
(0.020) 
0.907 
(0.029) 
1.042 
(0.052) 
1.49 
(1.23, 1.78) 
2.48 
(1.75, 3.38) 
4.16 
(2.47, 6.46) 
Wales 154 0.703 
(0.026) 
0.797 
(0.038) 
0.918 
(0.047) 
1.08 
(0.89, 1.33) 
1.36 
(0.94, 1.95) 
1.75 
(0.98, 3.00) 
Scotland 341 0.717 
(0.020) 
0.842 
(0.026) 
0.936 
(0.039) 
1.15 
(0.99, 1.35) 
1.56 
(1.14, 2.05) 
2.13 
(1.33, 3.12) 
Northern Ireland 81 0.683 
(0.040) 
0.879 
(0.064) 
1.084 
(0.116) 
1.56 
(1.12, 2.29) 
2.65 
(1.36, 5.02) 
4.66 
(1.64, 11.41) 
equality test (excl oth)  p = 0.221 p = 0.584     
Newspaper               
Express / Mail 472 0.695 
(0.016) 
0.831 
(0.022) 
0.935 
(0.029) 
1.17 
(1.05, 1.31) 
1.61 
(1.31, 2.01) 
2.22 
(1.61, 3.05) 
Sun / Star 435 0.694 
(0.016) 
0.852 
(0.024) 
0.892 
(0.031) 
1.16 
(1.03, 1.33) 
1.70 
(1.30, 2.21) 
2.50 
(1.66, 3.60) 
Mirror / Record 307 0.714 
(0.021) 
0.870 
(0.030) 
0.905 
(0.039) 
1.17 
(0.97, 1.40) 
1.70 
(1.18, 2.37) 
2.51 
(1.42, 4.01) 
Guardian / Independent 340 0.679 
(0.016) 
0.911 
(0.025) 
1.273 
(0.052) 
1.86 
(1.61, 2.12) 
3.21 
(2.43, 4.07) 
5.56 
(3.67, 7.77) 
FT / Times / Telegraph 291 0.772 
(0.021) 
0.861 
(0.026) 
0.974 
(0.039) 
1.13 
(0.98, 1.32) 
1.42 
(1.08, 1.89) 
1.78 
(1.18, 2.70) 
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 Characteristic N α β λ Λ(5) Λ(50) Λ(500) 
Other paper 354 0.714 
(0.018) 
0.858 
(0.024) 
1.020 
(0.035) 
1.29 
(1.12, 1.46) 
1.80 
(1.35, 2.27) 
2.53 
(1.65, 3.58) 
No paper 1160 0.696 
(0.010) 
0.881 
(0.015) 
1.039 
(0.026) 
1.40 
(1.29, 1.53) 
2.16 
(1.83, 2.50) 
3.32 
(2.61, 4.12) 
equality test  p = 0.026 p = 0.307     
Political party               
Conservative 828 0.724 
(0.012) 
0.849 
(0.015) 
0.974 
(0.023) 
1.20 
(1.10, 1.31) 
1.60 
(1.37, 1.87) 
2.14 
(1.71, 2.68) 
Labour 1086 0.696 
(0.011) 
0.872 
(0.015) 
0.972 
(0.022) 
1.29 
(1.17, 1.41) 
1.94 
(1.61, 2.27) 
2.93 
(2.22, 3.69) 
Liberal Democrat 296 0.676 
(0.018) 
0.915 
(0.028) 
1.146 
(0.053) 
1.68 
(1.42, 1.99) 
2.94 
(2.16, 4.00) 
5.16 
(3.27, 8.02) 
SNP or Plaid Cymru 82 0.751 
(0.043) 
0.823 
(0.051) 
0.909 
(0.084) 
1.03 
(0.72, 1.43) 
1.27 
(0.64, 2.28) 
1.63 
(0.55, 3.65) 
Other party 297 0.682 
(0.020) 
0.891 
(0.032) 
1.003 
(0.052) 
1.44 
(1.20, 1.68) 
2.40 
(1.72, 3.18) 
4.02 
(2.46, 6.06) 
No party 617 0.704 
(0.014) 
0.857 
(0.020) 
1.023 
(0.033) 
1.33 
(1.19, 1.50) 
1.93 
(1.57, 2.41) 
2.80 
(2.07, 3.86) 
Don't know / NA 153 0.721 
(0.029) 
0.878 
(0.044) 
0.999 
(0.071) 
1.30 
(0.99, 1.70) 
1.93 
(1.13, 3.13) 
2.94 
(1.31, 5.84) 
equality test (excl DK/NA)  p = 0.139 p = 0.325     
Religion               
None 422 0.728 
(0.018) 
0.874 
(0.026) 
0.993 
(0.046) 
1.27 
(1.09, 1.51) 
1.81 
(1.35, 2.45) 
2.59 
(1.68, 3.99) 
Ch of England 451 0.670 
(0.016) 
0.874 
(0.024) 
0.952 
(0.033) 
1.32 
(1.17, 1.53) 
2.12 
(1.64, 2.84) 
3.44 
(2.28, 5.25) 
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 Characteristic N α β λ Λ(5) Λ(50) Λ(500) 
Roman Catholic 136 0.698 
(0.032) 
0.862 
(0.048) 
0.950 
(0.059) 
1.24 
(0.96, 1.62) 
1.85 
(1.11, 3.01) 
2.81 
(1.29, 5.51) 
Protestant 128 0.652 
(0.026) 
0.851 
(0.034) 
1.095 
(0.075) 
1.49 
(1.19, 1.85) 
2.36 
(1.53, 3.33) 
3.79 
(1.98, 6.14) 
Other 102 0.676 
(0.033) 
0.849 
(0.044) 
1.035 
(0.064) 
1.37 
(1.11, 1.69) 
2.07 
(1.37, 3.03) 
3.17 
(1.70, 5.48) 
NA 2120 0.711 
(0.007) 
0.867 
(0.010) 
1.003 
(0.017) 
1.29 
(1.21, 1.38) 
1.86 
(1.65, 2.08) 
2.68 
(2.25, 3.15) 
equality test (NA)  p = 0.086 p = 0.969     
Religiosity               
Religious 672 0.667 
(0.013) 
0.860 
(0.020) 
0.972 
(0.027) 
1.33 
(1.20, 1.46) 
2.07 
(1.72, 2.48) 
3.24 
(2.47, 4.22) 
Not religious 768 0.725 
(0.013) 
0.875 
(0.018) 
0.995 
(0.029) 
1.27 
(1.14, 1.42) 
1.81 
(1.43, 2.19) 
2.59 
(1.82, 3.44) 
Don't know / NA 1919 0.709 
(0.008) 
0.868 
(0.011) 
1.005 
(0.017) 
1.30 
(1.23, 1.38) 
1.89 
(1.68, 2.10) 
2.74 
(2.31, 3.19) 
equality test (excl DK/NA)   p = 0.002 p = 0.579         
Note:  The table presents results for the reduced sample of 3,359 respondents which excludes the 657 respondents who reported at least one apparently irrational choice, i.e., 
their responses did not completely satisfy the satiation requirement that 
1 2 3G G G< <  and 4 5 6L L L< < . N = number of respondents with each characteristic,  α  = 
degree of risk aversion in the domain of gains, β  = degree of risk aversion in the domain of losses, λ  = direct loss aversion (i.e., when the loss 1x = − ),  and ( )xΛ  is 
relative loss aversion comparing a loss of x  with a gain of x  (see Equation (4)), where x  = 5, 50 and 500. The null hypothesis for the equality test is that the parameters are 
equal across the categories of each characteristic and the null is rejected if the p-value is below the required significance level and accepted if it is above.  
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Table A5: Comparison of full sample and reduced sample estimation results 
 Characteristic α Reduced − α Full 
equality test 
β Reduced − β  Full 
equality test 
Λ(50) full Λ(50) reduced 
All 0.019 
p = 0.000 
0.035 
p = 0.000 
1.71 
(1.57, 1.85) 
1.89 
(1.73, 2.05) 
Gender         
Male 0.018 
p = 0.000 
0.029 
p = 0.000 
1.59 
(1.42, 1.77) 
1.70 
(1.48, 1.91) 
Female 0.019 
p = 0.000 
0.041 
p = 0.000 
1.83 
(1.64, 2.03) 
2.07 
(1.82, 2.32) 
Age   
18-24 0.012 
p = 0.030 
0.004 
p = 0.626 
2.25 
(1.69, 2.90) 
2.26 
(1.72, 2.92) 
25-34 0.016 
p = 0.030 
0.029 
p = 0.004 
1.92 
(1.50, 2.36) 
2.20 
(1.71, 2.83) 
35-44 0.024 
p = 0.000 
0.026 
p = 0.002 
1.15 
(0.95, 1.37) 
1.20 
(0.97, 1.43) 
45-54 0.020 
p = 0.001 
0.031 
p = 0.000 
1.41 
(1.18, 1.70) 
1.52 
(1.23, 1.83) 
55-64 0.016 
p = 0.001 
0.045 
p = 0.000 
1.99 
(1.72, 2.32) 
2.30 
(1.86, 2.82) 
65 & over 0.018 
p = 0.001 
0.047 
p = 0.000 
2.04 
(1.67, 2.39) 
2.37 
(1.94, 2.91) 
Age and gender         
M 18-24 -0.003 
p = 0.679 
0.003 
p = 0.641 
1.98 
(1.30, 2.90) 
2.16 
(1.43, 2.93) 
M 25-34 0.029 
p = 0.055 
0.038 
p = 0.065 
1.85 
(1.22, 2.60) 
2.09 
(1.18, 3.22) 
M 35-44 0.020 
p = 0.053 
0.015 
p = 0.303 
1.24 
(0.93, 1.62) 
1.24 
(0.87, 1.67) 
M 45-54 0.015 
p = 0.076 
0.021 
p = 0.047 
1.33 
(1.04, 1.74) 
1.40 
(1.01, 1.90) 
M 55-64 0.013 
p = 0.097 
0.049 
p = 0.000 
1.81 
(1.34, 2.37) 
2.23 
(1.68, 3.09) 
M 65 & over 0.027 
p = 0.000 
0.029 
p = 0.002 
1.74 
(1.33, 2.16) 
1.77 
(1.28, 2.30) 
F 18-24 0.024 
p = 0.001 
0.006 
p = 0.672 
2.58 
(1.74, 3.64) 
2.44 
(1.73, 3.41) 
F 25-34 0.011 
p = 0.185 
0.026 
p = 0.025 
2.03 
(1.50, 2.62) 
2.25 
(1.64, 3.09) 
F 35-44 0.027 
p = 0.001 
0.034 
p = 0.000 
1.14 
(0.89, 1.43) 
1.19 
(0.90, 1.53) 
F 45-54 0.022 
p = 0.011 
0.039 
p = 0.001 
1.48 
(1.20, 1.81) 
1.71 
(1.30, 2.22) 
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 Characteristic α Reduced − α Full 
equality test 
β Reduced − β  Full 
equality test 
Λ(50) full Λ(50) reduced 
F 55-64 0.019 
p = 0.002 
0.043 
p = 0.000 
2.14 
(1.70, 2.63) 
2.37 
(1.84, 2.93) 
F 65 & over 0.004 
p = 0.608 
0.073 
p = 0.000 
2.47 
(1.87, 3.17) 
3.51 
(2.52, 4.75) 
Marital status   
Married or living 
with partner 
0.019 
p = 0.000 
0.038 
p = 0.000 
1.69 
(1.55, 1.85) 
1.90 
(1.69, 2.15) 
Single 0.022 
p = 0.000 
0.020 
p = 0.002 
1.64 
(1.39, 1.95) 
1.66 
(1.34, 1.98) 
Widowed, 
separated or 
divorced 
0.005 
p = 0.501 
0.050 
p = 0.000 
1.93 
(1.54, 2.40) 
2.48 
(1.82, 3.31) 
Number of children   
No children 0.019 
p = 0.000 
0.035 
p = 0.000 
1.96 
(1.76, 2.16) 
2.18 
(1.95, 2.41) 
One or more 
children 
0.012 
p = 0.046 
0.036 
p = 0.000 
1.24 
(1.08, 1.42) 
1.46 
(1.16, 1.78) 
No answer 0.037 
p = 0.000 
0.032 
p = 0.017 
1.28 
(0.98, 1.63) 
1.29 
(0.93, 1.78) 
Health status   
Better than 
average 
0.019 
p = 0.000 
0.043 
p = 0.000 
1.86 
(1.60, 2.17) 
2.19 
(1.84, 2.64) 
Average 0.017 
p = 0.000 
0.031 
p = 0.000 
1.67 
(1.50, 1.87) 
1.82 
(1.62, 2.05) 
Worse than 
average 
0.021 
p = 0.000 
0.035 
p = 0.000 
1.65 
(1.41, 1.88) 
1.79 
(1.42, 2.24) 
Personality type 1   
Type A 
(competitive) 
0.020 
p = 0.000 
0.034 
p = 0.000 
1.34 
(1.16, 1.53) 
1.48 
(1.24, 1.72) 
Type B (laid 
back) 
0.018 
p = 0.000 
0.035 
p = 0.000 
1.89 
(1.73, 2.06) 
2.10 
(1.87, 2.35) 
Personality type 2   
Optimist 0.016 
p = 0.000 
0.036 
p = 0.000 
1.58 
(1.44, 1.73) 
1.79 
(1.60, 2.00) 
Pessimist 0.025 
p = 0.000 
0.032 
p = 0.000 
1.98 
(1.75, 2.25) 
2.12 
(1.76, 2.46) 
Emotional state   
Tense 0.015 
p = 0.117 
0.034 
p = 0.002 
1.82 
(1.39, 2.48) 
2.12 
(1.59, 2.82) 
Neutral 0.019 
p = 0.000 
0.033 
p = 0.000 
2.00 
(1.79, 2.23) 
2.23 
(1.96, 2.54) 
Relaxed 0.018 
p = 0.000 
0.037 
p = 0.000 
1.49 
(1.29, 1.66) 
1.65 
(1.41, 1.85) 
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 Characteristic α Reduced − α Full 
equality test 
β Reduced − β  Full 
equality test 
Λ(50) full Λ(50) reduced 
Not sure 0.032 
p = 0.171 
0.027 
p = 0.296 
1.13 
(0.56, 1.95) 
1.09 
(0.49, 2.05) 
Education   
16 & under 0.013 
p = 0.012 
0.052 
p = 0.000 
1.54 
(1.32, 1.74) 
1.87 
(1.55, 2.27) 
17-19 0.019 
p = 0.001 
0.037 
p = 0.000 
1.80 
(1.48, 2.14) 
1.98 
(1.63, 2.39) 
20 & over 0.018 
p = 0.000 
0.016 
p = 0.001 
1.80 
(1.59, 2.09) 
1.82 
(1.56, 2.06) 
Other 0.021 
p = 0.000 
0.038 
p = 0.000 
1.80 
(1.51, 2.14) 
2.01 
(1.62, 2.45) 
Financial 
knowledge 
        
Low 0.020 
p = 0.000 
0.041 
p = 0.000 
2.06 
(1.74, 2.44) 
2.31 
(1.88, 2.76) 
Medium 0.017 
p = 0.000 
0.035 
p = 0.000 
1.63 
(1.49, 1.80) 
1.80 
(1.62, 1.98) 
High 0.020 
p = 0.016 
0.015 
p = 0.136 
1.68 
(1.25, 2.18) 
1.73 
(1.32, 2.33) 
Social class         
A 0.022 
p = 0.000 
0.028 
p = 0.000 
1.30 
(1.07, 1.57) 
1.33 
(1.05, 1.67) 
B 0.018 
p = 0.000 
0.032 
p = 0.000 
1.97 
(1.70, 2.28) 
2.17 
(1.77, 2.63) 
C1 0.009 
p = 0.054 
0.036 
p = 0.000 
1.70 
(1.49, 1.94) 
2.00 
(1.70, 2.30) 
C2 0.020 
p = 0.004 
0.023 
p = 0.023 
1.59 
(1.30, 1.91) 
1.70 
(1.34, 2.15) 
D 0.016 
p = 0.044 
0.052 
p = 0.000 
1.76 
(1.34, 2.32) 
2.18 
(1.54, 3.01) 
E 0.023 
p = 0.015 
0.057 
p = 0.000 
2.27 
(1.69, 2.96) 
2.77 
(1.93, 3.81) 
Not available 0.029 
p = 0.055 
0.030 
p = 0.157 
1.76 
(0.95, 2.65) 
1.84 
(1.04, 2.95) 
Employment 
status 
        
Full-time 0.010 
p = 0.007 
0.021 
p = 0.000 
1.43 
(1.25, 1.61) 
1.56 
(1.39, 1.79) 
Part-time 0.019 
p = 0.004 
0.044 
p = 0.000 
1.56 
(1.28, 1.90) 
1.79 
(1.42, 2.16) 
Student 0.016 
p = 0.066 
0.024 
p = 0.015 
2.77 
(1.89, 3.89) 
3.03 
(2.05, 4.59) 
Retired 0.025 
p = 0.000 
0.046 
p = 0.000 
1.91 
(1.64, 2.23) 
2.16 
(1.81, 2.59) 
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 Characteristic α Reduced − α Full 
equality test 
β Reduced − β  Full 
equality test 
Λ(50) full Λ(50) reduced 
Not working 0.017 
p = 0.026 
0.033 
p = 0.020 
2.42 
(1.86, 3.14) 
2.73 
(1.92, 3.69) 
No answer 0.040 
p = 0.005 
0.099 
p = 0.000 
2.26 
(1.27, 3.82) 
2.92 
(1.55, 5.24) 
Management 
responsibility 
        
Owner, etc 0.001 
p = 0.931 
0.030 
p = 0.007 
1.52 
(1.10, 1.93) 
1.84 
(1.34, 2.42) 
Senior manager 0.003 
p = 0.820 
0.013 
p = 0.268 
1.19 
(0.79, 1.81) 
1.29 
(0.80, 1.93) 
Middle manager 0.019 
p = 0.011 
0.006 
p = 0.569 
0.89 
(0.69, 1.12) 
0.88 
(0.68, 1.13) 
Junior manager 0.013 
p = 0.120 
0.034 
p = 0.001 
1.77 
(1.39, 2.23) 
2.10 
(1.58, 2.64) 
No management 
responsibility 
0.017 
p = 0.000 
0.033 
p = 0.000 
1.74 
(1.51, 2.03) 
1.95 
(1.65, 2.31) 
Other / NA 0.024 
p = 0.000 
0.046 
p = 0.000 
1.96 
(1.73, 2.19) 
2.26 
(1.99, 2.58) 
Employment 
sector 
        
Self-employed 0.011 
p = 0.192 
0.042 
p = 0.000 
1.76 
(1.36, 2.20) 
2.12 
(1.56, 2.87) 
Private sector 0.012 
p = 0.013 
0.044 
p = 0.000 
1.41 
(1.22, 1.62) 
1.72 
(1.47, 2.01) 
Public 
corporation 
0.018 
p = 0.004 
0.003 
p = 0.726 
1.67 
(1.31, 2.05) 
1.58 
(1.25, 2.03) 
Public sector 0.025 
p = 0.000 
0.023 
p = 0.026 
2.15 
(1.74, 2.64) 
2.20 
(1.65, 2.85) 
Charity sector 0.032 
p = 0.004 
0.042 
p = 0.023 
2.23 
(1.54, 2.94) 
2.43 
(1.62, 3.45) 
Other / NA 0.023 
p = 0.000 
0.041 
p = 0.000 
1.83 
(1.55, 2.14) 
2.05 
(1.72, 2.38) 
Job security         
Secure 0.014 
p = 0.000 
0.028 
p = 0.000 
1.48 
(1.31, 1.66) 
1.66 
(1.45, 1.87) 
Insecure 0.010 
p = 0.157 
0.023 
p = 0.004 
1.37 
(1.07, 1.74) 
1.48 
(1.16, 1.88) 
No answer 0.024 
p = 0.000 
0.045 
p = 0.000 
2.07 
(1.84, 2.34) 
2.35 
(2.07, 2.66) 
Income         
Below £15,000 0.025 
p = 0.000 
0.042 
p = 0.000 
2.07 
(1.78, 2.37) 
2.39 
(1.97, 2.93) 
£15,000-£29,999 0.013 
p = 0.001 
0.031 
p = 0.000 
1.78 
(1.56, 1.99) 
2.00 
(1.68, 2.39) 
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 Characteristic α Reduced − α Full 
equality test 
β Reduced − β  Full 
equality test 
Λ(50) full Λ(50) reduced 
£30,000-£49,999 -0.007 
p = 0.382 
0.036 
p = 0.000 
1.29 
(1.07, 1.57) 
1.67 
(1.34, 2.03) 
£50,000 & above 0.023 
p = 0.014 
0.031 
p = 0.000 
0.90 
(0.63, 1.26) 
0.95 
(0.63, 1.32) 
No answer 0.026 
p = 0.000 
0.033 
p = 0.000 
1.71 
(1.50, 1.99) 
1.84 
(1.57, 2.16) 
Home 
ownership 
        
Own outright 0.016 
p = 0.006 
0.044 
p = 0.000 
2.06 
(1.66, 2.49) 
2.45 
(1.89, 3.10) 
Mortgage 0.026 
p = 0.000 
0.039 
p = 0.000 
1.60 
(1.34, 1.93) 
1.70 
(1.41, 2.04) 
Rent 0.020 
p = 0.040 
0.056 
p = 0.000 
1.53 
(1.15, 1.99) 
1.85 
(1.34, 2.53) 
No answer / don't 
know 
0.017 
p = 0.000 
0.027 
p = 0.000 
1.70 
(1.52, 1.88) 
1.82 
(1.63, 2.02) 
Savings         
Below £1,000 0.027 
p = 0.000 
0.040 
p = 0.000 
1.52 
(1.28, 1.81) 
1.69 
(1.42, 1.98) 
£1,000 - £9,999 0.009 
p = 0.082 
0.026 
p = 0.000 
1.66 
(1.43, 1.98) 
1.86 
(1.54, 2.21) 
£10,000 - 
£49,999 
0.016 
p = 0.003 
0.030 
p = 0.000 
1.90 
(1.62, 2.26) 
2.06 
(1.68, 2.46) 
£50,000 and 
above 
0.007 
p = 0.181 
0.030 
p = 0.000 
1.57 
(1.26, 1.90) 
1.77 
(1.34, 2.24) 
No answer 0.026 
p = 0.000 
0.044 
p = 0.000 
1.97 
(1.62, 2.32) 
2.20 
(1.82, 2.72) 
Ease of short-
term saving 
        
Easy 0.019 
p = 0.000 
0.033 
p = 0.000 
1.74 
(1.59, 1.90) 
1.91 
(1.70, 2.11) 
Not easy 0.018 
p = 0.000 
0.038 
p = 0.000 
1.68 
(1.46, 1.89) 
1.93 
(1.67, 2.23) 
Rainy day fund         
Yes 0.019 
p = 0.000 
0.031 
p = 0.000 
1.87 
(1.70, 2.04) 
2.01 
(1.79, 2.27) 
No 0.018 
p = 0.000 
0.042 
p = 0.000 
1.42 
(1.24, 1.64) 
1.64 
(1.39, 1.88) 
Region         
North East 0.018 
p = 0.106 
0.038 
p = 0.018 
1.57 
(1.09, 2.24) 
1.81 
(1.13, 2.55) 
North West 0.011 
p = 0.150 
0.049 
p = 0.000 
1.74 
(1.39, 2.09) 
2.14 
(1.70, 2.69) 
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 Characteristic α Reduced − α Full 
equality test 
β Reduced − β  Full 
equality test 
Λ(50) full Λ(50) reduced 
Yorkshire and 
the Humber 
0.013 
p = 0.078 
0.043 
p = 0.000 
1.71 
(1.30, 2.08) 
2.01 
(1.47, 2.58) 
East Midlands 0.017 
p = 0.029 
0.021 
p = 0.093 
2.14 
(1.61, 2.74) 
2.34 
(1.72, 3.16) 
West Midlands 0.042 
p = 0.000 
0.042 
p = 0.003 
1.67 
(1.25, 2.24) 
1.76 
(1.13, 2.52) 
East of England 0.018 
p = 0.036 
0.035 
p = 0.004 
1.98 
(1.52, 2.53) 
2.27 
(1.56, 3.19) 
London 0.023 
p = 0.002 
0.027 
p = 0.004 
1.45 
(1.18, 1.80) 
1.51 
(1.15, 1.95) 
South East 0.020 
p = 0.001 
0.028 
p = 0.006 
1.99 
(1.52, 2.57) 
2.12 
(1.64, 2.70) 
South West 0.005 
p = 0.522 
0.041 
p = 0.000 
1.96 
(1.49, 2.68) 
2.48 
(1.75, 3.38) 
Wales 0.041 
p = 0.000 
0.026 
p = 0.081 
1.48 
(1.09, 2.04) 
1.36 
(0.94, 1.95) 
Scotland 0.014 
p = 0.062 
0.025 
p = 0.007 
1.44 
(1.05, 1.83) 
1.56 
(1.14, 2.05) 
Northern Ireland 0.010 
p = 0.684 
0.060 
p = 0.011 
1.76 
(1.01, 3.14) 
2.65 
(1.36, 5.02) 
Newspaper         
Express / Mail 0.017 
p = 0.010 
0.036 
p = 0.000 
1.45 
(1.11, 1.76) 
1.61 
(1.31, 2.01) 
Sun / Star 0.022 
p = 0.003 
0.045 
p = 0.000 
1.48 
(1.24, 1.79) 
1.70 
(1.30, 2.21) 
Mirror / Record 0.013 
p = 0.223 
0.063 
p = 0.000 
1.30 
(0.99, 1.61) 
1.70 
(1.18, 2.37) 
Guardian / 
Independent 
0.009 
p = 0.117 
0.019 
p = 0.031 
2.93 
(2.29, 3.71) 
3.21 
(2.43, 4.07) 
FT / Times / 
Telegraph 
0.009 
p = 0.144 
0.031 
p = 0.000 
1.27 
(0.95, 1.64) 
1.42 
(1.08, 1.89) 
Other paper 0.026 
p = 0.001 
0.018 
p = 0.078 
1.79 
(1.37, 2.26) 
1.80 
(1.35, 2.27) 
No paper 0.021 
p = 0.000 
0.031 
p = 0.000 
1.96 
(1.69, 2.29) 
2.16 
(1.83, 2.50) 
Political party          
Conservative 0.014 
p = 0.001 
0.021 
p = 0.000 
1.52 
(1.30, 1.79) 
1.60 
(1.37, 1.87) 
Labour 0.012 
p = 0.012 
0.043 
p = 0.000 
1.64 
(1.42, 1.90) 
1.94 
(1.61, 2.27) 
Liberal 
Democrat 
0.019 
p = 0.000 
0.026 
p = 0.009 
2.81 
(2.14, 3.67) 
2.94 
(2.16, 4.00) 
SNP or Plaid 
Cymru 
0.022 
p = 0.222 
0.015 
p = 0.503 
1.27 
(0.71, 2.01) 
1.27 
(0.64, 2.28) 
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 Characteristic α Reduced − α Full 
equality test 
β Reduced − β  Full 
equality test 
Λ(50) full Λ(50) reduced 
Other party 0.028 
p = 0.000 
0.044 
p = 0.000 
2.06 
(1.53, 2.68) 
2.40 
(1.72, 3.18) 
No party 0.025 
p = 0.000 
0.044 
p = 0.000 
1.65 
(1.36, 1.97) 
1.93 
(1.57, 2.41) 
Don't know / NA 0.043 
p = 0.000 
0.015 
p = 0.395 
2.17 
(1.43, 3.39) 
1.93 
(1.13, 3.13) 
Religion         
None 0.021 
p = 0.004 
0.042 
p = 0.000 
1.56 
(1.19, 2.03) 
1.81 
(1.35, 2.45) 
Ch of England 0.021 
p = 0.002 
0.062 
p = 0.000 
1.74 
(1.40, 2.14) 
2.12 
(1.64, 2.84) 
Roman Catholic 0.017 
p = 0.271 
0.044 
p = 0.015 
1.57 
(1.05, 2.33) 
1.85 
(1.11, 3.01) 
Protestant 0.034 
p = 0.001 
0.022 
p = 0.183 
2.39 
(1.76, 3.32) 
2.36 
(1.53, 3.33) 
Other 0.019 
p = 0.125 
0.028 
p = 0.106 
1.96 
(1.30, 2.84) 
2.07 
(1.37, 3.03) 
NA 0.016 
p = 0.000 
0.028 
p = 0.000 
1.70 
(1.54, 1.88) 
1.86 
(1.65, 2.08) 
Religiosity         
Religious 0.023 
p = 0.000 
0.049 
p = 0.000 
1.80 
(1.50, 2.18) 
2.07 
(1.72, 2.48) 
Not religious 0.020 
p = 0.000 
0.038 
p = 0.000 
1.62 
(1.34, 1.92) 
1.81 
(1.43, 2.19) 
Don't know / NA 0.016 
p = 0.000 
0.028 
p = 0.000 
1.72 
(1.57, 1.87) 
1.89 
(1.68, 2.10) 
Note: The table compares α  (the degree of risk aversion in the domain of gains), β  (the degree of risk aversion 
in the domain of losses) and ( )50Λ  (relative loss aversion comparing a loss of  50 with a gain of  50, see 
Equation (4)) for the full sample of 4,016 respondents and the reduced sample of 3,359 respondents which 
excludes the 657 respondents who reported at least one apparently irrational choice, i.e., their responses did not 
completely satisfy the satiation requirement that 
1 2 3G G G< <  and 4 5 6L L L< < . The null hypothesis for 
the equality test is that the parameters for the full and reduced samples are equal across the categories of each 
characteristic and the null is rejected if the p-value is below the required significance level and accepted if it is 
above.   
 
 
 
